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SEEKING (SOME) CLIMATE JUSTICE IN STATE TORT 
LAW 
Karen C. Sokol 
Abstract: Over the last decade, an increasing number of path-breaking cases have been 
filed throughout the world, seeking to hold fossil fuel industry companies and governments 
accountable for their actions and inactions that have contributed to the climate crisis. This 
Article focuses on an important subset of those cases namely, the recent surge of cases 
brought by states, cities, and counties all over the United States alleging that the largest fossil 
fuel industry actors, including ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and Chevron, are liable in state tort law 
for harms caused by climate change. 
The Article begins with a synthesis of the history of U.S. climate tort litigation, grouping 
the cases in o o a es.  The c rren  s a e or  cases are in he second wave and represent 
an attempt to avoid the legal pitfalls that plagued the first. The Article then undertakes the first 
close e amina ion of he defendan s  response o he second-wave climate tort cases; namely, 
ha  he federal common la  of n isance preemp s all he plain iffs  s a e or  claims. 
Unsurprisingly, the issue has divided the courts that have decided it, as the Supreme Court case 
law is sparse and unclear. The Article identifies the doctrinal problem in the case law, and then 
argues that the only way to bring coherence to the law while adhering to federalism principles 
is to disallow preemption of state tort law by federal common law in these cases. Finally, the 
Article offers a new perspective on why that is also the right result as a policy matter. 
The second-wave climate tort suits are part of a larger global movement of resorting to the 
courts to demand climate justice after decades of inaction by policymakers. The current era of 
climate disruption and its catastrophic threats demand not only new and improved legal and 
policy mechanisms, but also the use of current ones including state tort law to the fullest 
extent possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 450 Inupiat residents of the Native Village of Kivalina, which lies 
on the frozen tundra of Alaska along the edge of the Arctic Ocean, are 
among the increasing number of communities in the world who are losing 
their ability to survive because of climate disruption.1 With temperature 
increases that double the global average, Alaska is one of the canaries in 
the coal mine of the climate crisis.2 The Arc ic s ice has diminished b  
half over the last three decades, triggering a series of reactions that are 
transforming the environment.3 The Inupiat risk plunging into frigid 
waters whenever they use their snowmobiles the only viable motorized 
                                                     
1. See, for example, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee s increasingly strong recognition of 
the role of climate disruption in refugee movements. Climate Change and Disaster Displacement, 
U.N. High Comm r, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html 
[https://perma.cc/JCS2-LAY3] ( People are trying to adapt to the changing environment, but many 
are being forcibly displaced from their homes by the effects of climate change and disasters, or are 
relocating in order to survive. New displacement patterns, and competition over depleted natural 
resources can spark conflict between communities or compound pre-existing vulnerabilities. People 
displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters may in some circumstances 
be in need of international protection. Refugee law therefore has an important role to play in 
this area. ). 
2. Joe McCarthy, How a Tiny Alaska Town Is Leading the Way on Climate Change, HUFFPOST 
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means of transportation in the region.4 That, along with the fact that their 
principal source of food is the wildlife whose habitats are being destroyed 
by rising sea levels, means that the Inupiat communities are losing their 
ability to feed themselves.5 
The In pia  people s home ill e en all  s ffer he same fa e as he 
wildlife they depend on: according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the island on which Kivalina sits will be under water within ten years.6 
Life has always been challenging on the frozen tundra, but in the face of 
the climate crisis, it is no longer possible. And the federal government has 
still not done anything about it.7 Left unprotected by their government, the 
Inupiat sued ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Shell, and other major fossil fuel 
companies for their contribution to the climate crisis.8 The Inupiat claimed 
the right to monetary compensation to relocate based on the federal 
common law claim of public nuisance.9 
Over a decade ago, in 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) noted the likelihood of an increase in cases, such as the 
one brought by Kivalina, that are now often referred to as clima e  or 
clima e j s ice  li iga ion.10 The reason for the increase, according to the 
IPCC, is ha  countries and citizens [will] become dissatisfied with the 
pace of international and national decision-making on clima e change. 11 
The IPCC was right: A 2019 analysis of climate cases by the Grantham 
Research Institute of Climate Change and Environment determined that 
                                                     
4. Id. 
5. Melia Robinson, This Remote Alaskan Village Could Disappear Under Water Within 10 Years - 
Here s What Life Is Like There, BUS. INSIDER INDIA (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.in/This-remote-Alaskan-village-could-disappear-under-water-within-
10-years-heres-what-life-is-like-there/articleshow/60858974.cms [https://perma.cc/2ZQ6-2265].  
6. Id. 
7. Although in 2015 President Obama did submit a proposal to Congress that would have allocated 
$400 million for the residents of Kivalina and other Alaskan communities to relocate, Congress never 
approved it. Robinson, supra note 5. 
8. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). The village sued a total of twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies. 
Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See generally, e.g., Chilenye Nwapi, From Responsibility to Cost-Effectiveness to Litigation: 
The Evolution of Climate Change Regulation and the Emergence of Climate Justice Litigation, in 
CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 517, 531
41 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016) (describing the litigation as a mechanism for seeking clima e j s ice  
and referring o i  as clima e j s ice li iga ion ). 
11. Sangata Gupta et al., 2007: Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangement, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 745, 793 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 
2007).  
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[c]lima e change li iga ion con in es o e pand across j risdic ions as a 
tool to strengthen climate action . . . . 12 As one of the report authors 
s a ed, [h]olding go ernmen  and b sinesses o acco n  for failing o 
comba  clima e change has become a global phenomenon. 13 
In addition to suits against national governments based on international 
law, constitutions, and environmental laws, the IPCC pointed to one of 
the first climate tort cases brought in the United States: Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co. (AEP).14 AEP launched what this Article 
calls he firs  a e  of clima e or  cases.15 After AEP was filed, an 
increasing number of other climate tort cases were filed throughout the 
country. This wave of litigation did not end until 2011, when the U.S. 
S preme Co r  s r ck do n he plain iffs  claims in American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP).16 In its wake, the pace of climate tort 
filings slowed down to a trickle. Since 2017, however, the pace of filings 
has increased dramatically, beginning a second wave. As of this writing, 
that wave continues to surge, far surpassing its predecessor in strength 
and size. 
The clima e or  cases in his second a e  are e en s ronger han he 
first wave for two related reasons. First, these recent claims stand on 
robust factual foundations. They are supported by: (1) mounting scientific 
evidence for both of the harms caused by climate disruption, and of 
specific fossil f el companies  con rib ions o clima e change, and 
(2) con in ing re ela ions of he de ails of he companies  decades-long 
knowledge of that evidence and attempts to suppress it with a massive 
disinformation campaign. Federal district court Judge William Smith 
powerfully summarized the supporting evidence in these cases in his 
opinion remanding Rhode Island s second-wave climate tort case back to 
                                                     
12. JOANA SETZER & REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 2019 
SNAPSHOT 1, 1 (2019).  
13. Press Release, Grantham Rsch. Inst. on Climate Change and the Env t, Climate Change 
Lawsuits Expand to at Least 28 Countries Around the World, The London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci. 
(July  4,  2019)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/ 
climate-change-lawsuits-expand-to-at-least-28-countries-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/E9QS-
259X].  
14. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y 2005), vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), 
rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
15. The application of this term to the climate tort suits is inspired by Professor Robert Rabin s 
effective use of it in his insightful examination and analysis of the long history of litigation against 
the tobacco industry. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in 
REGULATING TOBACCO 176 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (explicating the 
tobacco tort cases in terms of three a es,  characterized by the parties  strategies and courts  
responses to them). 
16. 564 U.S. 410 (2011). This decision is explained infra section I.C. 
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state court: 
Climate change is expensive, and the State wants help paying for 
it. Specifically from Defendants in this case, who together have 
extracted, advertised, and sold a substantial percentage of the 
fossil fuels burned globally since the 1960s. This activity has 
released an immense amount of greenhouse gas in o he Ear h s 
atmosphere, changing its climate and leading to all kinds of 
displacement, death (extinctions, even), and destruction. What is 
more, Defendants understood the consequences of their activity 
decades ago, when transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable 
sources of energy would have saved a world of trouble. But 
instead of sounding the alarm, Defendants went out of their way 
to becloud the emerging scientific consensus and further delay 
changes however existentially necessary that would in any 
way interfere with their multibillion-dollar profits. All while 
quietly readying their capital for the coming fallout.17 
Second, all the second-wave plaintiffs have brought only state tort 
claims, and all but one have brought their claims in state courts.18 In the 
first wave, most plaintiffs brought federal common law claims in addition 
to state claims, and all filed in federal courts. As this Article explains, state 
tort law is in many ways much better suited than federal common law for 
claims based on doc men a ion of companies  disinforma ion campaigns 
designed to suppress and obfuscate scientific evidence of harm caused by 
their products. And state courts, which have the authority to create and 
develop state tort law and regularly decide tort claims, are usually more 
adept than federal courts at adjudicating those claims. Thus, the use of 
state tort law, together with strong factual foundations, make the second-
wave climate tort cases quite powerful. 
It is not surprising, then, that the fossil fuel industry defendants are 
fighting harder than ever against the cases, attacking them both in court 
and in public relations messaging. One of their legal arguments presents 
a significant risk that these important and potent state claims will not be 
heard: namely, that federal common law of nuisance19 preempts all the 
second-wave state tort claims. Defendants then seek to remove the claims, 
now transformed into federal common law claims, to federal court, where 
they expect to be able to successfully argue for dismissal on the same 
                                                     
17. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019). 
18. As of this writing, fourteen cases have been brought. See infra notes 129 138 and 
accompanying text. 
19. The focus of this Article is the federal common law nuisance claims that are the basis of the 
defendants  arguments for dismissal of the climate tort claims. It does not address the very different 
body of judge-made federal maritime law. 
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grounds that brought an end to the first-wave cases: displacement by the 
Clean Air Act or justiciability. This Article argues that, as a matter of both 
law and policy, this defense should be rejected, and these path-breaking 
state climate tort claims allowed to proceed. 
This Article adds a few important things to discussions about the 
climate tort cases. First, it provides a unique narrative of their history that 
c lmina es in a close e amina ion of he fossil f el defendan s  defense 
strategy that has divided district courts. Second, it identifies the doctrinal 
problem in he S preme Co r s case la  ha  he second-wave defendants 
are exploiting with their most recent argument and proposes a way to 
resolve the problem. Finally, this Article offers a new perspective on why 
allowing the second-wave climate suits to have their day in court is the 
right result, not only as a legal matter, but also as a policy matter. 
Part I begins with a narrative of the fate of the four first-wave climate 
tort cases. None survived motions to dismiss, and this Part organizes the 
first- a e cases b  he defendan s  hree s ccessf l arg men s: (1) the 
political question doctrine; (2) lack of Article III standing; and 
(3) displacement of federal common law. Part II describes the second-
wave climate tor  cases and he defendan s  la es  arg men . Par  III 
explains the Supreme Court law relevant to that argument. It then argues 
that although that law is admittedly sparse and thus unclear, the only way 
to bring coherence to the law while adhering to federalism principles is to 
reject the possibility that state tort law can ever be preempted by federal 
common law alone. Part IV argues that this is also the right result as a 
matter of policy. The Article briefly concludes with an explanation of the 
significance of the fate of the state climate claims for both tort law and 
climate policy in this country. 
I. THE FIRST WAVE OF CLIMATE TORT CASES (2004 TO 
2016) 
In AEP, a group of states, New York City, and three private land trusts 
sued major electric power companies for climate harms, including 
significant risks to public lands, infrastructure, and the health of their 
residents.20 Because the five defendants were the largest emitters of 
carbon dioxide in the United States and together emitted 2.5% of all 
anthropogenic emissions on the planet, the plaintiffs argued that the 
companies were liable for creating a s bs an ial and nreasonable 
interference with public rights  nder bo h federal common la  and s a e 
                                                     
20. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418. 
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tort law.21 The plaintiffs filed their claims in federal court.22 
Although the AEP litigation consequently lasted seven years, the case 
never went to trial. Nor did any of the other first-wave cases. The fossil 
fuel industry defendants succeeded in getting all these cases dismissed on 
the pleadings on one or more of three grounds: (1) the political question 
doctrine; (2) lack of standing; or (3) displacement of the federal common 
law claim. The following three sections explain each, describing each 
first-wave case in the process. 
A. The Political Question Doctrine 
In three of the first-wave climate cases, the district courts determined 
that the cases presented a non-justiciable political question. The 
Constitution does not mention poli ical q es ion ; he S preme Co r  
developed the doctrine based on separation of powers principles.23 In the 
1962 case Baker v. Carr,24 the Supreme Court set out a factor-based test 
for determining whether a case raises a political question and is thus non-
justiciable.25 In AEP the district court concluded that one of those factors 
was so dominant in the case that it required dismissal on political question 
gro nds: he impossibili  of deciding i ho  an ini ial polic  
de ermina ion of a kind clearl  for nonj dicial discre ion. 26 No previous 
federal common law nuisance case involving pollution, the court 
reasoned, o ched on so man  areas of na ional and in erna ional polic  
presented by the climate case.27 In contrast to previous cases, the court 
reasoned, deciding the climate nuisance claim would mean making 
decisions about carbon-dio ide le els of he companies  emissions ha  
                                                     
21. Id. (citing Brief of the Petitioner at 103 05, 145 47, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174)). 
22. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 11 (1962) ( The nonj s iciabili  of a poli ical q es ion is 
primaril  a f nc ion of he separa ion of po ers. ). 
24. Id. 
25. See id. a  217 ( Prominen  on he s rface of an  case held o in ol e a poli ical q es ion is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discre ion; or he impossibili  of a co r s nder aking independen  resol ion i ho  e pressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
prono ncemen s b  ario s depar men s on one q es ion. ). 
26. AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). All the 
factors are listed supra note 25. 
27. Id. at 272. 
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o ld req ire[] iden ifica ion and balancing of economic, 
en ironmen al, foreign polic , and na ional sec ri  in eres s. 28 Thus, the 
court held that such decisions were for the political branches and granted 
he defendan s  mo ion o dismiss.29 
Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in AEP, two more first-
wave cases were filed California v. General Motors Corp.30 and Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.31 In both, the district courts 
reached the same conclusion as the AEP district court.32 Each of the other 
five Baker factors was implicated in the two decisions. 
In General Motors, California s A orne  General s ed he si  larges  
motor vehicle manufacturers responsible for 20% of all anthropogenic 
U.S. emissions and over 30% of all anthropogenic emissions in 
California alleging liability for their contributions to the p blic 
n isance  of global arming.33 The state brought nuisance claims under 
both federal common law and California tort law, and sought damages for 
ario s clima e harms, incl ding a decrease in he s a e s a er s ppl  
caused by a reduction in snow pack, increased flooding, coastline erosion 
caused by sea level rise, and increases in risk and intensity of wildfires.34 
The district court in General Motors dismissed the case, agreeing with 
the defendants that the federal common law nuisance claim presented the 
court with a nonjusticiable political question.35 The court relied heavily 
on he dis ric  co r s decision in AEP, and its reasoning essentially 
racked ha  in he firs  co r s opinion.36 Because a federal common law 
n isance claim req ires he plain iff o demons ra e ha  he defendan s  
ac i i ies crea ed an unreasonable interference with a right common to 
he general p blic,  he co r  o ld ha e o balance he compe ing 
interests of reducing global warming emissions and the interests of 
                                                     
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).  
31. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
32. General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16.  
33. Id. at *1. California brought the case against the Big Six  motor vehicle manufacturers
General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Daimler Chrysler, and Nissan. Id. 
34. Id. at *1 2. California gets 35% of its water supply from snow pack in the Sierra Nevada region. 
Id. at *1. 
35. Id. at *16. 
36. See id. at *8 (citing the AEP court s reasoning, concluding that although the AEP plaintiffs 
sought equitable relief while California sought damages, he same j s iciabili  concerns 
predomina e and significan l  cons rain his Co r s abili  o properl  adj dica e he [federal 
common la ] claim ). 
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ad ancing and preser ing economic and ind s rial de elopmen . 37 Such 
balancing, according o he co r , is the type of initial policy 
de ermina ion o be made b  he poli ical branches  rather than the 
courts.38 The court went on to point to various congressional and 
executive actions and refusals to act on various climate issues at the 
national and international levels to support its conclusion that the third 
Baker fac or made ha  he co r  called California s federal common 
la  global arming n isance or  claim  non-justiciable.39 
The district court found further support for that determination in its 
assessment of the first Baker fac or: he her here is a e all  
demons rable cons i ional commi men  of he iss e o  he poli ical 
branches.40 The General Motors Court agreed with the defendants that the 
federal nuisance claim would sufficiently burden automobile national and 
in erna ional marke s o impinge bo h on Congress s po er o reg la e 
in ers a e commerce and bo h poli ical branches  foreign polic  po ers.41 
A nuisance claim based on climate disruption, the court reasoned, was no 
ordinary tort claim. According o he co r , recogni ing s ch a ne  and 
unprecedented federal common law nuisance claim for damages would 
likel  ha e commerce implica ions in o her S a es. 42 Further, the court 
concluded that recognizing the nuisance claim would interfere with the 
foreign policy decision of the political branches to refuse to commit to 
reduction of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in international 
climate negotiations.43 
The court also found that its determination that the nuisance claim was 
npreceden ed  implicated the second Baker factor a lack of 
j diciall  disco erable or manageable s andards. 44 Rejecting 
California s arg men  ha  he co r  had s fficien  federal common la  
precedent addressing nuisance claims involving interstate pollution to 
equip it o resol e he s a e s n isance claim, he co r  concl ded ha  
these previous cases were unhelpful because they involved injunctive 
                                                     
37. Id. at *8 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1981)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at *8 13. The court went on to find that the first and second Baker factors also eigh in 
favor of he Co r s finding ha  Plain iff s claim presen s a non-j s iciable poli ical q es ion.  Id. at 
*13 15. All the factors are listed in supra note 25. 
40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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relief, rather than damages, and because they did not involve the sort of 
complex issues that were presented by a nuisance claim based on 
anthropogenic climate disruption.45 According to the court, there was no 
a  a j dicial s andard co ld be form la ed o decide ha  is an 
nreasonable con rib ion o he s m of carbon dio ide in he Ear h s 
atmosphere, or . . . who should bear the costs associated with the global 
climate change that admittedly result from multiple sources around 
the globe. 46 
Like the General Motors Court, the Kivalina district court concluded 
that the second and third Baker factors required dismissal on political 
question grounds.47 The co r s reasoning for each as similar, and 
echoed that of both the AEP and General Motors district courts for all the 
Baker factors that they assessed: that the federal nuisance claims based on 
clima e ere npreceden ed  in that they raised myriad issues of the sort 
that federal courts were institutionally incapable of addressing.48 
Importantly, all three district courts dismissed the cases because their 
determination that the federal common law nuisance claim presented a 
political question rendered only federal courts without jurisdiction.49 
Th s, he co r s did no  address he defendan s  arg men s agains  he 
state tort claims, and dismissed the cases without prejudice to refile in 
state court.50 
California dropped its case,51 but both the AEP and Kivalina plaintiffs 
                                                     
45. Id. 
46. Id. at *15. 
47. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873 77 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). Unlike the General Motors Court, the Kivalina district 
court concluded that the first Baker factor was not implicated by the federal nuisance claim. Id. at 
872 73. 
48. See id. at 876 ( Plain iffs  global arming n isance claim seeks o impose liabili  and damages 
on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution case . . . . Consequently . . . application of the 
second Baker fac or precl des j dicial considera ion of Plain iff s federal n isance claim. ); id. at 877 
( [T]he alloca ion of fa l and cost of global warming is a matter appropriately left for 
de ermina ion b  he e ec i e or legisla i e branch in he firs  ins ance. ).  
49. General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. 
50. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883; General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16; see Connecticut 
v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing only the 
federal nuisance claim), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
51. California initially appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but withdrew its case in June of 2009, citing 
recent indications of progress on climate mitigation and adaptation, including the new Obama 
administration s policy changes and the EPA s finding that greenhouse gases were pollutants  
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. See Colum. L. Sch. Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L. 
& Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Case Documents for California v. General Motors Corp., 
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIG. DATABASE [hereinafter Climate Change Common Law Database], 
http://climatecasechart.com/case/california-v-gm-corp/ [https://perma.cc/EXU4-YZQP]. 
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appealed he dis ric  co r s decisions in heir cases. And he  ere 
successful in AEP: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed.52 Emphasizing the limited nature of the political question 
doctrine and the highly case-specific nature of the factor-based inquiry,53 
the appellate court closely evaluated each of the six Baker factors and 
concluded that none of them were sufficiently implicated by the case to 
render it non-justiciable.54 According to the court of appeals, the district 
co r s anal sis of he hird fac or the impossibili  of deciding i ho  
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discre ion failed o acco n  for he na re of he plain iffs  claim and, 
thus, for what it would require a court to decide.55 Because the plaintiffs 
alleged specific harms by specific emitters,56 the Second Circuit reasoned, 
resolving the case would not require a court to answer questions of 
national and international climate policies that must be decided by the 
poli ical branches. E en ho gh he claims alleged ha  he defendan s  
emissions contributed to climate disruption and sought redress for harms 
ca sed hereb , he case as s ill an ordinar  or  s i  of the sort that 
courts address all the time.57 
The defendants made several other arguments for dismissal that the 
district court declined to address, all of which the Second Circuit rejected. 
The Supreme Court did not, however. As discussed below,58 the Court 
reversed the Second Circuit on the ground that the federal common law 
nuisance claim was displaced by federal statutory law. 
It was based on this decision by the Supreme Court in AEP, rather than 
on the political question doctrine, that the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed he dis ric  co r s dismissal of Ki alina s case.59 In the 
meantime, lower courts continued to dismiss most of the other first-wave 
                                                     
52. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 
410 (2011).  
53. See id. at 323 (noting that he poli ical q es ion doc rine m s  be ca io sl  in oked,  and that 
Baker demands a discrimina ing inq ir  in o he precise fac s and pos re of he par ic lar case  
before a co r  ma  i hhold i s o n cons i ional po er o resol e cases and con ro ersies  (firs  
quoting Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994); and then quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 
529 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
54. See id. at 324 32. 
55. See id. at 331 (quoting McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 
2007)). 
56. See id. at 330 31. 
57. Id. at 331 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille 
Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
58. See infra section I.C. 
59. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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cases on the grounds that they presented a non-justiciable political 
question or that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 
B. Standing 
Because the district courts in AEP and General Motors concluded that 
the political question doctrine rendered them without jurisdiction, they 
declined o address he defendan s  o her arg men s, incl ding ha  he 
plaintiffs lacked standing.60 The district courts in the two other first-wave 
cases Kivalina and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA61 did, however.62 Both 
concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims in 
federal court. 
The Kivalina district court concluded that federal courts were without 
j risdic ion o er he illagers  case based on he federal Ar icle III 
standing doctrine as well as on the political question doctrine.63 Like the 
political question doctrine, federal standing is a constitutional doctrine 
based on the separation of powers.64 Also like the political question 
doc rine, he s anding doc rine is a prod c  of he S preme Co r s 
                                                     
60. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); General Motors, 2007 WL 
2726871, at *16. 
61. 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009). For the rather remarkable subsequent history of this case, 
see infra notes 103 105 and accompanying text. 
62. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 82 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). There were two other cases in the first-wave period that 
brought tort claims for alleged climate harms, but this Article does not include them among the first-
wave cases because it focuses only on tort claims that, like those in the second-wave, (1) are brought 
against corporate actors whose business activities contribute to climate disruption, and (2) allege only 
climate harms. Most cases filed in this time period fit that description (AEP, Comer, General Motors, 
and Kivalina), but there are two that do not.  
First, Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859, 2005 WL 2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) was brought 
against the EPA rather than a private actor. Id. 
Second, in PAWS Holdings, LLC v. Daikin Indus., Ltd., No. CV 116-058, 2017 WL 706624 (S.D. 
Ga. Feb. 22, 2017), the plaintiff brought negligence and products liability claims against 
manufacturers of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units, alleging that their products were 
defective because they were made of material that permitted leaking of corrosive refrigerant, which 
destroyed the units well before the end of their useful life. Id. at *2. The principal injuries that the 
plaintiff alleged were monetary losses because of premature product malfunction, and the health and 
safety risks posed by exposure to leaked refrigerant. Id. The plaintiff f r her allege[d]  ha  he ni s 
harmed he en ironmen  beca se he leaking refrigeran  is a greenho se gas ha  is ho sands of 
times more potent than CO2.  Id. This is a very different sort of claim than those brought by all the 
other climate tort cases, which alleged only climate harms, and with great detail and specificity as to 
how the particular plaintiffs were impacted. See infra Part II (describing the allegations of harm in 
the first-wave and second-wave cases).  
63. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877 82. 
64. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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interpretation of Article III s limi a ion of he federal j diciar s a hori  
to deciding cases or controversies.65 The two doctrines are, however, 
distinct.66 To establish standing to bring a case, plaintiffs must allege that: 
(1) they have suffered an inj r  in fac ; (2) the injury is 
fairl  . . . trace[able]  o he defendan s ac ions; and (3) the injury will 
likely  . . . be redressed by a favorable decision. 67 
Plaintiffs, such as the Inupiat, who seek redress for harms to their land 
and o her proper  easil  es ablish he S preme Co r s inj r  in fac  
requirement of standing. As noted in the introduction, the barrier island is 
disappearing, as the sea ice that had protected it from powerful waves 
diminishes. Tha  is nq es ionabl  an ac al,  concre e  inj r  ha  is 
                                                     
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
66. As noted supra text accompanying notes 10 13, the global surge in climate litigation includes 
cases against governments as well as cases against fossil fuel companies, such as the climate tort suits 
in the United States. One of the most important climate cases against governments is Juliana v. United 
States. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). In that case, the plaintiffs twenty-one young people and 
a climate scientist acting as guardian for future generations asserted that the U.S. Constitution 
protects a right to a clima e s s em capable of s s aining h man life.  Id. at 1250. The U.S. 
government violated that right, they claimed, because, for at least the past half century, in full 
knowledge of the grave danger that fossil fuel use and production present to the climate system, it 
nevertheless systematically promoted the development of a fossil fuel economy by myriad actions, 
incl ding appro ing, promo ing, and s bsidi ing fossil f el e plora ion, e rac ion, prod c ion, 
ranspor a ion, impor a ion, e por a ion, and comb s ion.  Id. at 1248. The plaintiffs sought 
declara or  and inj nc i e relief, req es ing ha  he co r  [o]rder Defendan s o prepare and 
implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down 
excess atmospheric CO2.  Id. at 1247 (quoting First Amended Complaint at ¶94, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 
3d 1224 (No. 6:15 cv 01517 TC)). 
District court Judge Ann Aiken agreed that the Constitution protects such a right and denied all of 
he go ernmen s mo ions o dismiss. Id. at 1250, 1276. The case never went to trial, however, because 
he Nin h Circ i  Co r  of Appeals agreed o hear he Tr mp Adminis ra ion s e raordinar  ri  
seeking interlocutory appeal, and a divided panel dismissed the Juliana case in January of 2020. 
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 66, 1175 (9 h Cir. 2020). The panel majori s 
ostensible ground for dismissal was that the plaintiffs had failed to establish he redressabili  
element of standing. Id. at 1171 72. As Judge Josephine Stanton persuasively argues in a scathing 
dissent, however, the majority in effect concluded that the case presented a political question, id. at 
1185 86, i ho  nder aking he diffic l  b  necessar  ask of marching p rposef ll  hro gh he 
Baker fac ors,  id. at 1189.  
Notwithstanding that Juliana is a constitutional case filed against the federal government in federal 
co r , Che ron s a orne  filed a le er i h he Nin h Circ i  Co r  of Appeals arg ing ha  Juliana 
required dismissal of the climate tort cases currently pending in that court. See Letter from Theodore 
J. Boutrous, Jr., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of Ct., U.S. Ct. of Appeals 
for the Ninth Cir. (Jan. 29, 2020). Regardless whether the Juliana panel majori s problema ic 
opinion remains good law, it is irrelevant to the climate tort cases, which, unlike Juliana, assert only 
state claims and seek only damages, and not injunctive relief. 
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 61 (alteration in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 41 42, 38 (1976)). As the Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine of standing is 
[o]ne of hose landmarks, se ing apar  he Cases  and Con ro ersies  ha  are of he j s iciable sor  
referred o in Ar icle III.  Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
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par ic lar  o he Ki alina illagers, ra her han one ha  is h po he ical  
or suffered by the public generally.68 Similarly, there is no question that 
the relief that Kivalina sought monetary compensation to relocate
would serve to redress that harm.69 However, the Kivalina district court 
concluded that the villagers failed to establish the fairl  raceable or 
ca sa ion  requirement.70 
According to the Supreme Court, the causation prong of Article III 
standing limits federal jurisdiction to those cases in which the alleged 
inj r  fairl  can be raced o he challenged ac ion of he defendan , and 
not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not 
before he co r . 71 Although, as the Kivalina court noted, plaintiffs need 
not allege facts sufficient to establish proximate causation to establish 
causation for purposes of Article III s anding, he  m s  ins ead sho  a 
s bs an ial likelihood ha  he defendan s cond c  ca sed [ he] inj r . 72 
The district court concluded that the Kivalina plaintiff failed to do so. 
According o he co r , he defendan s  cond c  ha  he plaintiffs 
complained of greenhouse gas emissions as no  fairl  raceable  o 
the climate harm of impending displacement faced by the villagers 
beca se hose emissions became par  of an ndifferen ia ed  mass of 
greenhouse gases that have been accumulating for cen ries  and o 
hich a m l i de of so rces other than he Defendan s  all o er he 
planet contributed.73 Th s, he co r  nders ood he Plain iffs  claim for 
damages [a]s dependent on a series of events far removed both in space 
and time from the Defendan s  alleged discharge of greenho se gases. 74 
S ch an e remel  a en a ed ca sa ion scenario,  reasoned the court, is 
not sufficient to support standing to bring a federal common law nuisance 
claim.75 Such a climate claim is different, the court concluded, from the 
federal statutory claims at issue in the federal common law cases on which 
the plaintiffs relied, including some that involved challenges to discharges 
                                                     
68. Id. a  560 (e plaining ha  an inj r  in fac  is an in asion of a legally protected interest which 
is (a) concre e and par ic lari ed, and (b) ac al or imminen , no  conjec ral  or h po he ical.  
(citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))). 
69. Id. a  561 ( [I]  m s  be likel ,  as opposed o merel  spec la i e,  ha  he inj r  ill be 
redressed b  a fa orable decision.  (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 39)). 
70. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
71. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 42. 
72. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (quoting Habecker v. Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th 
Cir. 2008)). 
73. Id. at 880 81 (emphasis in original). 
74. Id. at 881. 
75. Id. at 880.  
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of pollutants by companies under the Clean Water Act (CWA),76 and one 
that involved a challenge o he En ironmen al Pro ec ion Agenc s 
(EPA) failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA).77 Although it acknowledged that there were factual 
similarities between the causal chain alleged by the village of Kivalina 
and those alleged by the plaintiffs in these cases particularly that alleged 
in the CAA case the court concluded that the fact that the CWA and 
CAA plaintiffs brought claims under federal statutes rather than federal 
common law made all the difference for purposes of standing. 
In the CWA cases, Congress had set a standard for the amount of 
allowable pollutant discharge into waterways, and thus the plaintiffs could 
allege that the named defendants exceeded that limit.78 Under those cases, 
reasoned the Kivalina district court, such an allegation entitles plaintiffs 
to a presumption that the defendant sufficiently contributed  to [their] 
inj r  e en ho gh i  ma  no  be possible o race he inj r  o a 
par ic lar en i  beca se Congress had de ermined ha  e cessi e 
discharges were harmful.79 In con ras , here are no federal s andards 
limiting the discharge of greenhouse gases,  and h s he Kivalina 
plaintiffs were unable to sufficiently connect the particular defendant 
companies  emissions i h heir inj ries.80 
Because the CAA case did involve discharge of greenhouse gases, the 
court could not distinguish it, as it did for the CWA cases, by pointing to 
the existence of a congressional standard serving to link prohibited 
conduct with the capacity to harm. In that case, Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,81 the Supreme Court held that several 
states had standing to sue the EPA for refusing to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions under the CAA.82 Like Ki alina, Massach se s s alleged inj r  
was disappearance of its land due to anthropogenic climate disruption.83 
                                                     
76. See id. at 878 82 (first citing Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 
64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990); and then citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 
204 F.3d 149, 161 62 (4th Cir. 2000)). In these statutory cases, the plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 
the citizen suit provisions of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, and the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
77. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
78. The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the National Pollutant Discharge System  to limit 
the amount of pollutants that facilities can discharge into waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342. Any unauthorized pollutant discharge is unlawful under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
79. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 879 80 (quoting Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point 
Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
80. Id. at 880. 
81. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
82. Id. at 526. 
83. Id. at 522. 
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Massachusetts made similar factual allegations to those made by Kivalina 
regarding the causal link between that injury and the challenged 
conduct i.e., he EPA s ref sal o reg la e greenho se gas emissions.84 
Ne er heless, he co r  dis ing ished Ki alina s case based on he fac  
that the claim in Massachusetts was statutory, rather than common law. 
Specifically, the court stated that the Kivalina plain iffs ere no  seeking 
o enforce an  proced ral righ s concerning an agenc s r lemaking 
a hori ,  but instead asserted a claim for damages direc ed agains  a 
arie  of pri a e en i ies. 85 Thus, like the CWA cases, the Kivalina 
district court concluded that a statutory provision served to somehow 
sufficiently link the conduct with the injury for the Massachusetts 
plaintiffs to establish the causation requirement of Article III standing. 
Curiously, however, the court did not look to the nature of the federal 
common law claim, as it did with the statutory claims, to determine 
whether the Kivalina plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to establish 
causation for purposes of standing to bring the sort of claim that they had 
brought.86 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did focus on the 
na re of he plain iffs  or  claims in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,87 and 
determined that they had established Article III standing. 
In Comer, Mississippi land and property owners sued several oil, 
energy, and chemical companies for damage to the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
caused by Hurricane Katrina and sea level rise.88 The district court in 
                                                     
84. See id. at 523 26 ( While i  ma  be r e ha  reg la ing mo or-vehicle emissions will not by 
itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA 
has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. . . . The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is 
ne er heless real.  (emphasis in original)). 
85. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882. 
86. Neither did Judge Pro, the district judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit panel that heard Kivalina s 
appeal. As noted, because the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court s dismissal of the villagers  case 
based on the Supreme Court s intervening decision in AEP, holding that the CAA displaced the 
federal common law claim in that case, the court declined to address the district court s political 
question and standing analyses. See supra text accompanying notes 58 59. Judge Pro, however, did 
address standing in a concurring opinion. Because he understood the nature of the federal common 
law nuisance claim in the same way as the district court, he agreed with that court that Kivalina did 
not meet the causation requirement of the standing doctrine. He concluded that Kivalina had failed to 
establish the requisite causal nexus because they neither alleged a specific point in time at which 
their injury occurred nor tie[d] it to [the defendants ] activities within this vast time frame  in which 
global warming has been occurring. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 868 
(9th Cir. 2012). Thus, he reasoned, the villagers could not rely on Massachusetts. See id. at 869 ( It 
is one thing to hold that a State has standing to pursue a statutory procedural right granted to it by 
Congress in he CAA o challenge he EPA s fail re o reg la e . . . . It is quite another to hold that a 
private party has standing to pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout 
history to hold liable for millions of dollars in damages. ). 
87. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). 
88. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860. 
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Comer concluded that the plaintiffs in that climate tort case lacked federal 
standing,89 but did not provide the reasons for its decision in a written 
opinion.90 The Comer plaintiffs appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel 
reached the opposite conclusion, reversing the district court and 
remanding so the plaintiffs could pursue their claims.91 Contrasting the 
Fif h Circ i s anal sis of he s anding ca sa ion  req iremen  i h he 
Kivalina district co r s anal sis of ha  req iremen  for he federal 
common law nuisance claim, illustrates the great significance of the 
co r s nders anding of he na re of a gi en claim whatever its legal 
source to standing analysis. 
Like in all the first-wave cases, the plaintiffs in Comer filed their claims 
in federal court. Unlike all the other plaintiffs in the first-wave cases, 
however, the Mississippi plaintiffs brought only state common law 
claims: public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.92 They alleged 
that the defendants were responsible for the damage because their 
business operations contributed to climate disruption, which caused 
increases in sea level and the severity of the storm.93 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erroneously 
dismissed their p blic and pri a e n isance, respass, and negligence 
claims,  b  pheld i s dismissal of heir nj s  enrichmen , ci il 
conspirac , and fra d len  misrepresen a ion claims. 94 Like the Kivalina 
plaintiffs, the Comer plain iffs easil  sa isfied he inj r  in fac  
requirement by alleging public and private property damage as well as the 
redressabili  req iremen  b  seeking mone ar  compensa ion. Th s, 
like the Kivalina defendants, the Comer defendants based their standing 
challenge on an argument that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that their 
inj ries ere fairl  raceable  o he defendan s  alleged 
tortious conduct.95 
As no ed, comparing he Fif h Circ i s anal sis of he s anding 
ca sa ion  req iremen  for he common la  claims bro gh  b  the 
Comer plaintiffs, with the Kivalina district co r s anal sis of ha  same 
requirement for the common law claim, reveals that it is crucial to closely 
                                                     
89. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05 CV 436 LG RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. 
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). 
90. In its summary order, the district court noted that it stated its reasoning into the record. Id. 
91. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 859. 
94. Id. at 879 80. 
95. See id. at 863 64. 
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inquire into the nature of the claim at issue to properly assess standing. In 
contrast to the Kivalina district court which did not even look to the 
elements of a federal common law nuisance claim in concluding the 
plaintiffs lacked standing the Fifth Circuit panel noted the elements of 
each of the Comer plain iffs  s a e or  la  claims in de ermining hether 
they had alleged sufficient facts to establish standing causation.96 That 
makes sense, as the causal link for any claim regardless of its legal 
source is between the alleged unlawful conduct of the defendant and the 
alleged harm suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, in the CWA cases, the link 
had o be be een discharge of a poll an  and harm o he plain iffs  
property, and in Massachusetts, be een he EPA s fail re o reg la e 
greenhouse gas emissions and loss of land. 
The Comer panel noted that in their first set of claims nuisance, 
trespass, and negligence the conduct that the plaintiffs alleged was 
or io s as he companies  greenho se gas emissions.97 The emissions 
were a public and private nuisance because they constituted an 
unreasonable interference i h he plain iffs  se of nearb  p blic 
property and of their own property; a trespass because they caused 
des r c i e and ha ardo s s bs ances o en er he plain iffs  proper ; and 
negligent because they unreasonably endangered the plaintiffs, the 
general p blic, and he en ironmen  in iola ion of he companies  d  
to avoid unreasonably causing harm by conducting their business.98 
Beca se i  caref ll  looked a  he na re of he plain iffs  or  claims in 
this way, the Fifth Circuit, in contrast to the Kivalina district court, agreed 
with the plaintiffs that, under Massachusetts, they had standing to bring 
each of these claims. Indeed, according to the Fifth Circuit, in 
Massachusetts the Court accepted a causal chain virtually identical in 
part to that alleged by plaintiffs, viz., ha  defendan s  greenho se gas 
emissions contributed to the warming of the environment, including the 
ocean s empera re, hich damaged plain iffs  coas al Mississippi 
property via sea level rise and the increased intensity of Hurricane 
Ka rina. 99 In fac ,  con in ed he co r , he Massachusetts Court 
recognized a causal chain extending one step further i.e., that because 
                                                     
96. See id. at 860 61. 
97. See id. at 863 ( [T]he . . . public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims[] 
all . . . rely on allegations of a causal link between greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and 
he des r c ion of he plain iffs  proper  b  rising sea le els and he added feroci  of H rricane 
Ka rina. ); see also id. (grouping the unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent 
misrepresen a ion claims oge her beca se he  ere all based on plain iffs  alleged inj ries ca sed 
b  defendan s  p blic rela ions campaigns and pricing of pe rochemicals ). 
98. Id. at 860 61. 
99. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). 
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the EPA did not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, motor vehicles 
emitted more greenhouse gasses than they otherwise would have, thus 
contributing to global warming, which injured Massachusetts lands 
through sea level rise and increased storm ferocity. 100 
Unlike the Kivalina district court, the Fifth Circuit panel did not even 
mention the existence of a right to bring an action against the EPA in the 
CAA, or any other statutory provision. Rather, its analysis focused on 
whether the alleged illegal conduct greenhouse gas emissions was 
fairly traceable  o he alleged harms o proper , h man heal h, and he 
environment. By these lights, as the court noted, the causal link in Comer 
was even closer than that accepted by the Court in Massachusetts. The 
Fif h Circ i  h s held ha  he companies  argument that standing was 
lacking for hese claims as without merit. 101 
The Fifth Circuit panel also found that the district court erred in finding 
ha  he plain iffs  n isance, negligence, and respass claims presen ed a 
political question, and remanded to the district court.102 The Fifth Circuit 
initially granted rehearing en banc,103 but then dismissed the appeal for 
lack of a quorum.104 Rather oddly, however, the majority reinstated the 
dis ric  co r s dismissal and aca ed he panel s decision.105 The Second 
Circ i s decision in AEP holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that 
their claim did not present a political question was reversed on other 
grounds by the Supreme Court, as discussed in the following section.106 
As no ed, in ligh  of he Co r s AEP decision, the Ninth Circuit in 
Kivalina also pheld he dis ric  co r s dismissal on displacemen  
grounds and declined to address the issues of standing and 
political question. 
                                                     
100. Id. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 879 80. The court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and 
fraudulent misrepresentation claims on the ground that they lacked pr den ial  s anding, a doc rine 
related to, but distinct from, Article III standing. See id. at 867 69. 
103. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). 
104. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 55 (5th Cir. 2010). 
105. Id. at 1055. Judges Davis, Stewart, and Dennis dissented from the dismissal of the appeal. Id. 
at 1055 56. J dge Dennis ro e a leng h  opinion dissen ing from ha  he called he shockingl  
unwarranted actions of ruling that the panel decision has been irrevocably vacated and dismissing the 
appeal without adjudicating its merits.  Id. at 1056. 
106. See discussion infra section I.C. After concluding that the district court erred in finding that 
the case presented a political question, see supra section I.A, the Second Circuit rejected the 
defendants  other arguments for dismissal, including lack of standing and displacement. See 
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 332, 349, 387 88 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 
564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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C. Displacement of Federal Common Law 
Many people have some idea what state tort law is, and, in fact, think 
of the common law as state law. That makes sense. After all, federal 
common law such as the public nuisance claim in AEP is much more 
limited than state common law, both in types of claims and the frequency 
with which they are brought. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized in the handful of public nuisance cases that it has decided, 
federal common la  is an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal 
courts. 107 Federal common law is relatively rare for two reasons. First, 
state common law is usually more appropriate; only in exceptional cases 
involving a handful of interstate issues has the Court required a federal 
law of decision to ensure uniformity.108 Second, because this need for a 
federal law of decision is the only reason justifying federal common law, 
it is appropriate only when Congress has not addressed the issue presented 
by the case.109 As the Court has noted, [f]ederal common la  is a 
necessar  e pedien  ha  is no longer necessar  once Congress has 
addressed the issue.110 Th s, Congress need no  affirma i el  proscribe[] 
he se of federal common la ; ra her, he q es ion is he her Congress 
has enac ed legisla ion ha  addresse[s]  or sp[eaks] direc l  o he 
issue.111 When Congress has done so, he federal s a e displaces  
federal common law.112 
In AEP, he S preme Co r  held ha  ha  he plain iffs  federal 
common law claim was displaced by the CAA.113 The Court reasoned that, 
because the plaintiffs so gh  aba emen  of he defendan s  emissions, and 
the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate those emissions, Congress had 
sp[oken] direc l  o he iss e.114 Thus, courts had nothing to say about 
                                                     
107. Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). 
108. Id. at 335 36. 
109. Id. at 313 14. 
110. Id. at 314 (quoting Comm. for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976)). 
111. Id. at 315. 
112. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 423 24 (2011). The doctrine 
of displacement applies to federal common law only. The doctrine of preemption, by contrast, applies 
to state law only (whether state statutory or common law). For a full explanation of federal preemption 
of state law, see infra Part III. 
113. Id. at 423 ( [I]  is an academic q es ion he her, in he absence of he Clean Air Ac  and he 
EPA actions the Act authorizes, the plaintiffs could state a federal common-law claim for curtailment 
of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global warming. Any such claim would 
be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions. ). 
114. Id. a  424. More specificall , he plain iffs so gh  inj nc i e relief req iring each defendan  
o cap i s carbon dio ide emissions and hen red ce hem b  a specified percen age each year for at 
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the matter through federal common law, and the Second Circuit 
erroneously concluded otherwise. 
In reaching its conclusion that the federal nuisance claim in AEP was 
not displaced, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the CAA authorized 
the EPA to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases.115 However, 
according to the court, that authorization alone did not displace a nuisance 
claim seeking abatement of those emissions by the defendants, because 
the EPA had yet to exercise that authority by issuing regulations.116 Until 
and nless he Agenc  did so, he co r  held he CAA does 
not . . . reg la e  emissions of he sor  ha  he plain iffs so gh  o aba e 
through the federal common law.117 
When AEP reached the Supreme Court, the EPA had still not regulated 
greenhouse gas emissions. That did not matter, however: in a unanimous 
opinion, the Court agreed with the defendants that the legislative 
authorization alone meant that Congress had addressed the issue and thus 
displaced federal common law.118 Similar to the Kivalina district court in 
its standing analysis, the Court did not give more than a cursory reference 
to the nature of a federal common law public nuisance claim in reaching 
its conclusion that the claim was displaced. Rather, in so holding, the 
Co r  highligh ed he differen  ins i ional capaci ies of e per  
administrative agencies such as the EPA and courts.119 The Court 
                                                     
leas  a decade.  Id. at 419 (quoting Complaint at 110, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (No. 10-174)).  
115. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 378 (2d Cir. 2009) ( Af er 
Massachusetts, i  is clear ha  EPA has s a or  a hori  o reg la e greenho se gases as a poll an  
under the Clean Air Act. ), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
116. Id. at 379 80. 
117. Id. at 381. The court left open the question whether such a nuisance claim would be displaced 
in the event that the EPA did exercise that regulatory authority. Id. 
118. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 26 ( The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the 
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants; the delegation is 
what displaces federal common law.  (emphasis added)); see also id. a  429 ( The Second Circ i  
erred . . . in ruling that federal judges may set limits on greenhouse gas emissions in face of a law 
empowering EPA to set the same limits . . . . ). 
119. See, e.g., id. a  419 ( The [CWA] ins alled an all-encompassing regulatory program, 
supervised by an expert administrative agency, to deal comprehensively with interstate water 
poll ion. ); id. a  426 ( [W]ere EPA o decline o reg la e carbon-dioxide emissions 
altogether . . . the federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal common law of 
n isance o pse  he Agenc s e per  de ermina ion. ); id. a  427 ( [T]his prescribed order of 
decisionmaking the first decider under the [CAA] is the expert administrative agency, the second, 
federal judges is yet another reason to resist setting emissions standards by judicial decree under 
federal or  la . ); id. a  428 ( I  is al oge her fi ing ha  Congress designa ed an e per  agenc , here, 
EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency is 
surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case 
injunctions. ). 
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e plained ha  [ ]he appropria e amo n  of reg la ion in an  par ic lar 
greenhouse gas-prod cing sec or  req ires comple  balancing  be een 
he en ironmen al benefi  po en iall  achie able  i h o r Na ion s 
energ  needs and he possibili  of economic disr p ion. 120 This is not a 
job ha  co r s are eq ipped o do, as he  lack he scien ific, economic, 
and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of 
his order. 121 But that is what, according to the Court, the federal nuisance 
claim o ld ask of co r s, since he  o ld ha e o de ermine, in he 
first instance, what amount of carbon-dioxide emissions is 
nreasonable. 122 Although a public nuisance under federal common 
law is an nreasonable in erference i h a righ  common o he general 
p blic, 123 the Court did not elaborate on the nature of the judicial inquiry 
specific to that common law claim by, for example, drawing on precedent 
elaborating on that standard. Instead, the Court just assumed that applying 
that standard would parallel that required of the EPA in the exercise of its 
CAA authority. 
Thus, even if the EPA never regulates carbon dioxide emissions, 
federal common law is not available for actions seeking abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions under AEP. However, that leaves open the 
question of whether plaintiffs can still bring federal nuisance claims for 
damages to compensate for climate harms caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions. After all, the CAA does not contain any provisions regarding 
damages to remedy harms caused by greenhouse gases or any other air 
pollutant. In the Kivalina plain iffs  appeal of he dis ric  co r s dismissal 
of their case, they argued that their nuisance claim was not displaced under 
AEP for this reason, as they were seeking compensation, not abatement of 
emissions.124 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that Supreme Court 
case la  indica ed ha  displacemen  of a federal common la  righ  of 
ac ion means displacemen  of [all] remedies,  and h s ha  AEP 
e ing ished Ki alina s federal common la  p blic n isance damage 
action, along with the federal common law public nuisance 
abatement ac ions. 125 
                                                     
120. Id. at 427. 
121. Id. at 428. 
122. Id. 
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
124. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012). 
125. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Pro, the district judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit panel in 
Kivalina, carefully analyzed the relevant Supreme Court case law to highlight the tension . . . on 
whether displacement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily calls for displacement of a damages 
claim.  Id. at 858. He ultimately agreed that under the best reading of the cases, the majority correctly 
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Importantly, the AEP Court made clear that its displacement decision 
impacted only the federal common la  claim. The Co r  h s le[f ] he 
matter [of the state tort claims] open for consideration on remand. 126 The 
shift to state law and state courts is one of the key distinguishing features 
of the second wave of climate tort suits. This makes sense given the fate 
of the first-wave suits. In addition to displacement, the other doctrines that 
have proven fatal to climate tort suits thus far the political question and 
Article III standing doctrines apply only in federal courts. Although 
state courts do apply these doctrines, they are based on state constitutions 
rather than on the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, state courts have a 
much greater familiarity with common law claims because, unlike federal 
courts, they adjudicate them regularly. As a result, they are in a much 
better position to evaluate grounds for dismissal in light of the specific 
nature of the tort claims alleged, rather than focusing on climate disruption 
generally, as the first-wave federal district courts did. As explained in 
greater detail below,127 for both these reasons, it is less likely that all state 
courts will dismiss the second wave of climate suits based on the state 
                                                     
decided that a damages claim was also displaced under AEP. Id. at 866. 
126. AEP, 564 U.S. a  429. The plain iffs did no  p rs e heir s a e la  claims af er he Co r s 
decision, ho e er. Beca se he  did no  allege s a e la  claims, he Nin h Circ i s decision ha  AEP 
required displacement of their federal common law claim brought their case to an end. See Kivalina, 
696 F.3d a  858. The co r  recogni ed ha  i s decision ob io sl  does no  aid Ki alina, hich i self 
is being displaced b  he rising sea.  Id. B  he sol ion o Ki alina s dire circ ms ance,  he co r  
con in ed, m s  res  in he hands of he legisla i e and e ec i e branches of o r go ernmen , no  
he federal common la .  Id. In January of 2020, the Native Village of Kivalina joined four Louisiana 
tribes in submitting a complaint to multiple U.N. special rapporteurs, claiming that the U.S. 
government is violating its international human rights obligations by failing to address climate 
impacts that result in forced displacement. See THE ALASKA INST. FOR JUST., RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLE IN ADDRESSING CLIMATE-FORCED DISPLACEMENT 3 (2020). The tribes allege:  
The United States government has known for decades that changes to the environment caused 
by the effects of climate change, as well as human-made disasters, threaten these coastal Tribal 
Nations in Alaska and Louisiana. Among these threats include rising sea levels, catastrophic 
storms, and unchecked extraction of oil and gas. When these threats impact citizens of these 
Tribal Nations, the government has failed to allocate funds, technical assistance and other 
reso rces o s ppor  he Tribes  righ  o self-determination to implement community-led 
adaptation efforts that effectively protect the lives and livelihoods of Tribal citizens [sic] The 
governmen s inac ion has gone be ond basic negligence here he go ernmen  has failed o 
engage, consult, acknowledge and promote the self-determination of these Tribes as they identify 
and develop adaptation strategies, including resettlement [sic]. By failing to act, the U.S. 
government has placed these Tribes at existential risk. 
Id. a  9. The  ask he Special Rappor e rs o find ha  clima e-forced displacement is a human rights 
crisis  and o make a n mber of recommenda ions o he U.S. go ernmen , incl ding [r]ecogni [ing] 
the self-de ermina ion and inheren  so ereign  of all of he Tribes,  es ablishing a reloca ion 
institutional framework that is based in human rights protections to adequately respond to the threats 
facing Tribal Nations, including the rapid provision of resources for adaptation efforts that protect the 
right to culture, health, safe-drinking a er, food, and adeq a e ho sing,  and f nding he ribal-led 
reloca ion process for he Alaska Na i e Village of Ki alina.  Id. at 10 11.  
127. See infra Part II. 
 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
1406 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1383 
 
versions of either doctrine. 
It thus makes sense that, rather than making these arguments in state 
courts, the defendants in the second-wave climate tort suits are arguing 
that all of the state claims are preempted by federal common law, and then 
attempting to remove them to federal court. If they are successful in this 
defense strategy, there is a significant chance that the second wave will 
suffer the same fate as its predecessor.128 The next Part describes this 
second wave of climate tort suits and the principal defense strategy to 
defea  hem: namel , o federali e  he s a e claims. 
II. THE SECOND WAVE OF CLIMATE TORT CASES (2017 TO 
PRESENT) 
The first wave of climate tort cases ended wi h he S preme Co r s 
displacement decision in AEP and he Nin h Circ i s e ension of i  o 
damages claims in Kivalina in 2012. The waters remained still for the next 
five years.129 But beginning in the summer of 2017, the pace of climate 
tort filings increased dramatically. In contrast to most of the first-wave 
cases, these recent plaintiffs are bringing only state claims. And, unlike all 
of the first-wave cases, all except one in the second wave have filed in 
state court, rather than federal. 
Beginning in July of 2017, several cities and counties, one state, and, 
most recently, a commercial fishing industry trade group, have filed state 
tort claims seeking compensation from fossil fuel industry defendants for 
current and future damages to infrastructure, land and other natural 
reso rces, residen s  heal h and proper , and li elihoods.130 Within just 
three years, the number of second-wave climate tort cases filed is now 
four times the total number of first-wave cases filed in the previous 
                                                     
128. Indeed, all the district courts that heard the first-wave cases held that one or both doctrines 
barred the suits. See supra sections I.A, I.B. Further, it bears mention that in AEP, four Justices 
o ld [ha e] h[e]ld ha  none of he plain iffs ha[d] Ar icle III standing.  564 U.S. at 420. Because 
Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the decision, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit s decision 
finding Article III standing and reversed its decision finding that the claim was not displaced by the 
CAA. Id. at 420, 429. 
129. A chronological listing of filings with links to court documents of all U.S. common law 
climate actions is available at Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51, at 
http://climatecasechart.com/case-category/common-law-claims/  [https://perma.cc/292K-AAA9]. 
The site is also an excellent resource on all types of climate litigation in the United States and in rest 
of the world. See id. PAWS Holdings was filed in 2016, but I do not include it among climate tort 
cases for purposes of this Article because the principal harms alleged were not related to climate 
disruption. See supra note 62. 
130. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51. 
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twelve years.131 
From July of 2017 through the end of the year, several California 
counties and cities sued Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and other major 
fossil fuel producers in state courts for current and future damage to 
homes and infrastructure caused by climate change induced sea level 
rise.132 New York City then brought the first second-wave suit of 2018, 
and the only one filed in federal court, suing the five largest fossil fuel 
producers for damages for various climate injuries, including more intense 
heat waves, extreme precipitation, and sea level rise.133 Next, the city of 
Boulder and two counties sued Suncor Energy and ExxonMobil in 
Colorado state courts, the first climate tort case brought by communities 
living in an interior, non-coastal region of the United States.134 A month 
later, in May of 2018, King County filed suit in Washington state court 
against BP and five other companies, alleging similar climate harms to 
those alleged by California coastal communities, as well as the threat 
presented by ocean acidification to he region s significan  shellfish 
industry.135 In July, Rhode Island became the first state plaintiff of these 
second-wave cases, filing suit against several companies.136 Later in the 
month, Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against twenty-six 
fossil fuel companies.137 A few months later, the Pacific Coast Federation 
of Fishermen s Associa ions the largest commercial fishing industry 
trade group on the west coast filed s i  seek[ing] o hold  se eral 
companies acco n able for ac e changes o he ocean off of California 
and Oregon that resulted, over the last three years, in prolonged regulatory 
closures of the Dungeness crab fisheries the most lucrative and reliable 
fisheries on the west coast. 138 
                                                     
131. Four cases were filed in the first wave, see supra Part I, and, thus far, sixteen cases have been 
filed since July of 2017. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51. 
132. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51. Summaries of each case are 
provided in the California entries in Climate Change Common Law Database. Id. 
133. See Complaint, City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018). The city 
alleged that the defendants were together responsible for over 11% of all the carbon and methane 
pollution from industrial sources that has accumulated in the atmosphere since the dawn of the 
Industrial Revolution.  Id. at 2. 
134. See Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Cnty. Comm rs v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 
No. 2018CV30349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Boulder Complaint]. 
135. See Complaint, King Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 9, 2018). 
King County includes Seattle and Bellevue. 
136. See Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 2, 
2018) [hereinafter Rhode Island Complaint]. 
137. See Plaintiff s Complaint, Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
July 20, 2018).  
138. See Complaint ¶ 1, Pac. Coast Fed n. of Fishermen s Ass ns v. Chevron Corp., No. CGC-18-
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The first case of 2020 was filed by the city and county of Honolulu 
against Sunoco, ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, and 
other major oil and gas companies. Honolulu is seeking damages for 
myriad climate harms, including bleaching of coral reefs, loss of marine 
life and several bird species unique to the region, flooding from sea level 
rise and more intense weather events, heatwaves, drought, and corrosion 
of the water mains of its drinking supply system from seawater 
intrusion.139 Honol l s clima e case is par ic larl  impor an  since, as he 
onl  island s a e, Ha ai i is par ic larl  lnerable o he clima e crisis.140 
Finally, the most recent filing as of this writing was by Minnesota, the 
second state to file a climate tort suit.141 Minneso a s case is he firs  o 
name the American Petroleum Institute, the major industry trade 
association of which the defendants in all the cases are members and the 
actions of which are extensively documented in all the complaints.142 
Minneso a s complain  is also no able beca se i  highligh s he 
disproportiona e impac  of he clima e crisis on he s a e s mos  lnerable 
                                                     
571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Fishermen s Complaint]. 
139. See Complaint ¶¶ 149 52, City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. 
Ct. Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Honolulu Complaint]. The Mayor of Maui County has also announced 
his intention to bring suit against fossil fuel companies. See Press Release, Cnty. of Maui Pub. Info. 
Off., Maui County to Hold Fossil Fuel Companies Accountable for Costs & 
Consequences  of  Climate  Change  (Oct.  29,  2019),  https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
6785849-Maui-Press-Release-Climate-Change-Lawsuit-10-29-19.html  [https://perma.cc/W7U6-
57MF].  
140. The most recent National Climate Assessment report details how Hawai i and U.S. affiliated 
Pacific Islands  (i.e., the Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, 
American Samoa, and Guam) are at risk from climate changes that will affect nearly every aspect of 
life.  Jo-Ann Leong et al., Ha ai i a d U.S. Affi ia ed Pacific I a d , in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 537, 538 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), 
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads [https://perma.cc/7LZR-N63G]. As a later report also 
details, the U.S. island territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S Virgin Islands face similar climate risks 
o food sec ri , he econom , c l re, and ecos s ems ser ices.  William A. Go ld e  al., U.S. 
Caribbean, in 2 IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL 
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 809, 816 (David R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018), 
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch20_US-Caribbean_Full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9QH-GDND]. Indeed, a recent report assessing levels of exposure and 
vulnerability to extreme weather events all over the world concluded that Puerto Rico was one of the 
hree co n ries and erri ories mos  affec ed b  e reme ea her e en s  in he period from 1999 o 
2018, along with Myanmar and Haiti. DAVID ECKSTEIN ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2020, 
at 4, 9 (Joanne Chapman-Rose & Janina Longwitz eds., 2019), https://germanwatch.org/sites/ 
germanwatch.org/files/20-2-01e%20Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202020_10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XDP-UGUF].  
141. See Complaint, Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 
24, 2020) [hereinafter  Minnesota  Complaint], https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/
2020/docs/ExxonKochAPI_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQZ8-5LLM]. 
142. Id. ¶¶ 13 16. 
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residents, including communities of color, those living in poverty, the 
elderly, and children.143 It alleges health effects from increasing 
heatwaves, wildfires, air pollution, and flooding.144 Indeed, the 
complain s opening paragraph s a es: Warming will continue with 
devastating economic and public-health consequences across the state 
and, in particular, disproportionately impact people living in poverty and 
people of color. 145 
As noted, all of these second-wave plaintiffs have brought only state 
or  claims. In response, all of he defendan s are seeking o federali e  
the state claims of the second-wave climate suits by arguing that federal 
common law preempts them. Also as noted, for the first time, the plaintiffs 
in most of the second-wave cases filed in state courts (all but one).146 In 
all of those cases, the defendants have also filed notices of removal to 
federal court on the ground that federal common law preemption of the 
state claims provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction under 
the federal-question statute.147 
These second-wave cases have understandably garnered significant 
attention because they rely on even more robust evidence than those of 
the first wave and are using potentially powerful litigation strategies. 
Sections A and B address each in turn. The final section of this Part 
e plains he defendan s  a emp  o federali e he s a e claims so he  can 
resort to the same or similar arguments that were successful in getting 
federal courts to dismiss the first-wave suits. 
A. S g E ide ce f Defe da  Re ibi i  f  C i a e Ha , 
Knowledge Thereof, and Disinformation Campaign to Suppress It 
Since he S preme Co r s AEP decision put an end to the first-wave 
cases, the evidence that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
disr p ed he plane s clima e s s em, and hereb  reaked m riad 
catastrophic harms at an ever-increasing pace, has steadily 
                                                     
143. See id. at 67. 
144. Id. ¶¶ 159, 161. 
145. Id. ¶ 1. In his press release anno ncing he s a e s s i , Minneso a A orne  General Kei h 
Ellison s a ed: Impac s from clima e change h r  o r lo -income residents and communities of color 
first and worst.  Press Release, Off. of Minn. Att y Gen. Keith Ellison, AG Ellison Sues ExxonMobil, 
Koch Industries & American Petroleum Institute for Deceiving, Defrauding Minnesotans About 
Climate Change (June 24, 2020), https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/06/24_ 
ExxonKochAPI.asp [https://perma.cc/4JJC-SCQD]. 
146. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ( The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
nder he Cons i ion, la s, or rea ies of he Uni ed S a es. ). 
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strengthened.148 The complaints filed by the second-wave climate tort 
plaintiffs lay out this scientific evidence in great, sobering detail. In 
addition to strong evidence of the causal links between anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts such as sea level rise, 
wildfires, and more intense storms, the plaintiffs present two timelines 
alongside each other to striking effect. First, [ ]he s bs an ial majori  of 
all greenhouse gas emissions in history has occurred since the 1950s, a 
period kno n as he Grea  Accelera ion. 149 Second, the complaints set 
for h e ensi e doc men ar  e idence ha  ano her accelera ion  ook 
place over the same period of time: namely, the fossil fuel industry 
became increasingly aware that their products were contributing to the 
dangerous transformation of the plane s clima e. In he 1950s, he 
companies and the American Petroleum Institute (API), the trade 
association of which all the major fossil fuel companies are members, 
began putting significant funding into research on the changes in the 
climate systems that would be caused by continued anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and the consequences for people and the 
                                                     
148. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 40 (Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo A. Meyer eds., 2015), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VD33-3VBG] ( H man infl ence on he clima e s s em is clear, and recen  
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have 
had idespread impac s on h man and na ral s s ems. ). 
The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since [the 2007 Synthesis 
Report]. Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in 
changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, and in global mean sea level 
rise; and it is extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since 
the mid-20th century. In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and 
human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate 
change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to 
changing climate. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).  
149. See Complaint ¶ 4, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
July 17, 2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Complaint] (quoting Will Steffen et al., The Trajectory of the 
Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration, 2 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 81 (2015)) (Imperial Beach s and 
Marin County s cases were consolidated with San Mateo s when removed to federal court). The 
Great Acceleration  was coined by a group of scientists working with the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme. See Great Acceleration, INT L GEOSPHERE-BIOSPHERE PROGRAMME, 
http://www.igbp.net/globalchange/greatacceleration.4.1b8ae20512db692f2a680001630.html 
[https://perma.cc/H4TC-5CCV]. In 2015, they published graphs showing socio-economic and Earth 
System trends from 1750 to 2000.  See Steffen et al., supra. To evaluate the rate and magnitude of 
human-dri en change compared o na ral ariabili ,  he  assess he increase in atmospheric carbon 
dioxide levels over time. Great Acceleration, supra. Based on hese findings, he  concl ded: Onl  
beyond the mid-20th century is there clear evidence for fundamental shifts in the state and functioning 
of the Earth System that are beyond [previous] range of variability . . . and driven by human 
ac i i ies.  S effen e  al., supra.  
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planet.150 The level of accuracy in the predictions of the various research 
reports over the years is striking. For example, the complaints quote from 
a series of reports by Stanford Research Institute scientists that the API 
received and distributed to its members in the late 1960s.151 The scientists 
s a ed ha  b  he ear 2000, [s]ignifican  empera re changes are almos  
cer ain o occ r,  and ha  he po en ial damage o o r en ironmen  co ld 
be se ere,  incl ding he mel ing of he An arc ic ice cap. 152 The report 
f r her s a ed ha  b  he same ear a mospheric CO2 concentrations 
o ld reach 370 ppm. 153 As Honol l s complain  no es, ha  is almos  
e ac l  ha  i  rned o  o be (369 ppm). 154 Wha  as missing, he 
scien is s said, as ork on air poll ion echnolog  and . . . systems in 
which CO2 emissions o ld be bro gh  nder con rol. 155 Similarly, a 
1979 Exxon internal memorandum stated that limiting the CO2 
concen ra ion in he a mosphere o ha  as ass med o be a rela i el  
safe le el for he en ironmen  o ld req ire [e]igh  percen  of fossil 
fuel resources . . . to be left in the gro nd,  minimal se of fossil f els 
such as shale oil, and rapid deployment of carbon-free energy systems.156 
In response, instead of taking measures to change their business 
activities to mitigate their consequences, the companies accelerated those 
activities, protected their infrastructure from the climate impacts they 
knew were coming, and mounted a concerted disinformation campaign to 
create doubt about the impact of fossil fuel products on the planet. For 
example, as late as the 1990s, the API created a public-relations front 
gro p ( he Global Clima e Science Comm nica ions Team ) hose 
stated mission as con incing [a] majori  of he American p blic  o 
recogni e[ ] ha  significan  ncer ain ies e is  in clima e science. 157 The 
goal of this disinformation campaign was to ensure that the climate crisis 
o ld be a non-issue, meaning that the Kyoto Protocol is defeated and 
                                                     
150. See, e.g., Honolulu Complaint, supra note 139, ¶ 48 ( In 1954, geochemis  Harrison Bro n 
and his colleagues at the California Institute of Technology wrote to the American Petroleum Institute, 
informing the trade association that preliminary measurements of natural archives of carbon in tree 
rings indicated that fossil fuels had caused atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to increase by about 5% 
since 1840. The American Petroleum Institute funded the scientists for various research projects, and 
measurements of carbon dioxide continued for at least one year and possibly longer, although the 
res l s ere ne er p blished or o her ise made a ailable o he p blic. ). 
151. Id. ¶ 55. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. ¶ 56. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. ¶ 55. 
156. Id. ¶ 61. 
157. See Boulder Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 426 27.  
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here are no f r her ini ia i es o h ar  he hrea  of clima e change. 158 
The San Mateo complaint powerfully summarizes the 
damning evidence: 
Defendan s  a areness of he nega i e implica ions of heir o n 
behavior corresponds almost exactly with the Great Acceleration, 
and with skyrocketing greenhouse gas emissions. With that 
knowledge, Defendants took steps to protect their own assets 
from these threats through immense internal investment in 
research, infrastructure improvements, and plans to exploit new 
opportunities in a warming world. . . . Defendants concealed the 
dangers, sought to undermine public support for greenhouse gas 
regulation, and engaged in massive campaigns to promote the 
ever-increasing use of their products at ever greater volumes.159 
The degree of he companies  accelera ion of heir fossil f el 
e ploi a ion is as o nding: The  ha e e rac ed from he ear h eno gh 
fossil fuel materials (i.e., crude oil, coal, and natural gas) to account for 
more than one in every five tons of CO2 and methane emitted 
orld ide. 160 At the same time, they ensured that there would be a 
demand for their products notwithstanding the dangerous consequences 
i h rongf l promo ion and marke ing ac i i ies. 161 As a result, the 
complain  alleges, he defendan s bear a dominan  responsibili  for 
global arming generall  and for Plain iffs  inj ries in par ic lar. 162 
This dual-pronged strategy of aggressively marketing products to 
create fossil-fuel dependent societies, coupled with massive and 
systematic disinformation campaigns to counter and obfuscate the 
catastrophic dangers of use of those products, has been so effective that 
we are now at the point where the problem can no longer be addressed 
merely by mitigation of emissions. Instead, we are experiencing and will 
continue to experience climate harms that must be adapted to and 
redressed.163 In a previous article I discussed a similar strategy, which I 
                                                     
158. Id. ¶ 427. The Kyoto Protocol is one of the key international climate agreements. 
159. San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, ¶¶ 6 7. 
160. Id. ¶ 14. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rights concluded in a 
recent report: 
[T]he scale of change required to limit warming to 1.5°C is historically unprecedented and c[an] 
onl  be achie ed hro gh socie al ransforma ion  and ambi io s emissions red c ion meas res. 
Even 1.5°C of warming an unrealistic, best-case scenario will lead to extreme temperatures 
in many regions and leave disadvantaged populations with food insecurity, lost incomes and 
livelihoods, and worse health. As many as 500 million people will be exposed and vulnerable to 
water stress, 36 million people could see lower crop yields and up to 4.5 billion people could be 
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called a s ra eg  of disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence,  sed b  he 
tobacco industry to continue selling its products in the face of mounting 
evidence of their deadly nature.164 The second-wave complaints make 
clear that there is now sufficient evidence to show that the fossil fuel 
industry was engaging in this strategy at around the same time that the 
tobacco industry was. That is perhaps not surprising considering that, as 
the complaints also lay out, many of the same people worked on 
effectuating the strategy for both industries.165 For example, the API and 
Exxon funded and promoted the work of two physicists Fred Seitz and 
Fred Singer who had previously worked for the tobacco industry to cast 
doubt on the scientific evidence establishing the dangers of tobacco 
product use.166 In heir book de ailing bo h ind s ries  disinforma ion 
campaigns designed to suppress and distort science, historians Naomi 
Oreskes and Erik Conway explain how, in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Singer attempted to counter the work of climate scientists on human-
induced global warming by associating calls for environmental 
protections to fears of the Soviet Union and communism then fueled by 
the Cold War. Oreskes and Conway quote from an essay that Singer wrote 
in 1991 stating ha  [ ]he real  agenda of en ironmen alis s and the 
scientists who provided data on which they relied was to destroy 
capitalism and replace it with some sort of worldwide utopian 
Socialism or perhaps Comm nism. 167 
It bears emphasis that the second-wave plain iffs  allega ions of hese 
d al accelera ion  imelines are s ppor ed b  e ensi e doc men ar  
evidence in their complaints; none of the cases have even reached 
discovery yet. And, given their promising new litigation strategies, some 
                                                     
exposed to heat waves. In all of these scenarios, the worst affected are the least well-off members 
of society. 
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Climate Change and Poverty, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/39 (July 
17, 2019). 
164. See Karen C. Sokol, Smoking Abroad and Smokeless at Home: Holding the Tobacco Industry 
Accountable in a New Era, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL Y 81, 94 102 (2010) (describing the 
disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence  s ra eg  as consis ing of (1) the pervasive dissemination of 
disinformation to encourage nonrational decisionmaking about tobacco product use, and (2) the 
subsequent deprivation of free choice on the part of those who become addicted to the products, even 
if he disinforma ion problem is correc ed ). 
165. See Boulder Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 430.  
166. See id.; see also NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 5, 35 (2010) 
(de ailing Sei s and Singer s ork for he obacco ind s r  helping o cas  do b  on he scien ific 
e idence linking smoking o dea h  and heir s bseq en  ork for fossil-fuel industry actors to 
undermine the scientific evidence linking anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to 
global warming). 
167. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 166, at 134. 
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may very well proceed to discovery, which will undoubtedly lead to even 
more evidence. 
B. Avoiding the Pitfalls of the First Wave: New Litigation Strategies 
The second-wave cases have made two primary changes in litigation 
strategy: (1) bringing only state tort claims, mostly in state court, and 
(2) basing the claims on the marketing of fossil fuel products, rather than 
on emission of greenhouse gases. 
Bringing only state claims makes dismissal on all three of the federal 
separation of powers grounds detailed in Part I much less likely. First, 
state claims cannot be displaced by the Clean Air Act, as displacement is 
a doctrine applicable only to federal common law. Indeed, as noted, in 
AEP the Supreme Court dismissed the federal nuisance claims on 
displacement grounds and indicated that the plaintiffs could refile their 
state claims in state court.168 State common law can be preempted by 
federal law, but, as discussed below, that is a different doctrine that has 
yet to be addressed in the context of climate tort claims. 
Further, although the standing and political question doctrines may still 
pose obstacles, state courts have their own standing and political question 
doctrines that differ from their federal counterparts in ways that could 
make them less likely to pose an obstacle to climate tort claims.169 
Importantly, many state courts have more relaxed standing requirements 
than those imposed at the federal level.170 And, even in cases in which 
                                                     
168. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
169. See Tracy Hester, Climate Tort Federalism, 13 FLA. INT L L. REV. 79, 85 86 (2018) ( [T]he 
s i ch o s a e la  claims i hin a s a e co r  s s em (or a federal co r s di ersi  j risdic ion) 
potentially sidesteps the most troublesome barriers that bedeviled federal common law tort climate 
claims. . . . Because state courts generally operate as courts of general jurisdiction, they avoid the 
deeply rooted limits woven into federal judicial powers as courts of limited jurisdiction subject to 
separa ion of po ers cons rain s and Ar icle III e al limi a ions. ); see also Nat Stern, The Political 
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 406 07 (1984) ( Despite th[e] absence of 
serious evolution in Supreme Court opinions [on the political question doctrine since Baker v. Carr], 
the idea of political questions has not escaped judicial attention entirely. The supreme courts of the 
states . . . have continued to address the notion of inherently nonjusticiable issues and have formulated 
heir o n poli ical q es ion doc rines. ). 
170. See Hester, supra note 169. As the Fifth Circuit panel noted in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, for 
e ample: Beca se Mississippi s Cons i ion does no  limi  he j dicial po er o cases or 
controversies, its courts have been more permissive than federal courts in granting standing to 
par ies,  finding s anding o s e hen [par ies] asser  a colorable in eres  in he s bjec  ma er of 
the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise 
pro ided b  la .  585 F.3d 855, 862 (5 h Cir. 2009) (q o ing State v. Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d 
401, 405 (Miss. 2001)). Under ha  s andard, he panel concl ded, he Plain iffs  claims easil  sa isf  
Mississippi s liberal s anding req iremen s.  Id. (quoting Van Slyke v. Bd. of Tr. of State Insts. of 
Higher Learning (Van Slyke II), 613 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993)). 
 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
2020] SEEKING CLIMATE JUSTICE IN STATE TORT LAW 1415 
 
state standing and political question analyses are similar to their federal 
counterparts, it is possible that state courts would assess their respective 
s a es  or  la  differen l  han a federal co r  o ld nder hese 
doctrines. After all, as discussed further below,171 state courts regularly 
adjudicate tort claims and contribute to tort la s e ol ion, and h s in 
all likelihood ill kno  he s a e s or  la  and i s dis inc i e 
jurisprudential nature much better than a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction would. 
The distinctive nature of state tort claims is particularly important 
where, as here, the law governing the claims is much richer than that 
governing the federal common law nuisance claims brought by the first-
wave plaintiffs. This relates to the second change in litigation strategy that 
makes the second-wave claims so potentially powerful i.e., basing them 
on he companies  marke ing of fossil f el prod c s, ra her han on heir 
emission of greenhouse gases. 
The focus on the marketing of fossil fuel products is important for two 
reasons. First, it makes it less likely that a court will determine that the 
claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act, which regulates emissions of 
greenhouse gases and other pollutants but does not address the marketing 
of fossil fuel products.172 Because those claims were never refiled, 
however, the question of whether those claims were preempted by the 
CAA was never raised. The defendants in the second wave will 
unquestionably raise the issue however, and the plaintiffs will be able to 
respond by emphasizing that the focus on marketing distinguishes their 
claims from the federal common law claims that the Court dismissed in 
AEP. F r her, he CAA has a sa ings cla se  ha  e plici l  preser es 
common law claims.173 The Supreme Court has relied on a similar 
provision in the Clean Water Act to hold that the CWA does not preempt 
certain state tort actions.174 
Second, here is a s rong arg men  ha  foc sing on he companies  
marketing practices better captures the wrongful nature of the conduct that 
caused the climate harms. Importantly, state tort law is much better 
equipped to handle claims regarding wrongful marketing of products than 
federal common law. Indeed, there is no federal common law precedent 
addressing product marketing. Rather, the relatively small number of 
Supreme Court cases applying the federal common law of nuisance 
                                                     
171. See infra Part IV. 
172. Preemption doctrine and its relevance to the climate tort litigation is discussed further infra 
Part III. 
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e). 
174. See infra text accompanying notes 235 240. 
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involve interstate pollution.175 In contrast, the state tort law of nuisance is 
much broader. In some states, courts have recognized its applicability in 
cases seeking to hold manufacturers accountable for their wrongful 
marketing of products, including manufacturers of lead paint,176 guns,177 
and opioids.178 
All of the second-wave plaintiffs except Minnesota have brought state 
nuisance claims. Minnesota179 and the plaintiffs in four of the other 
                                                     
175. See infra Part III. 
176. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (2017) (upholding a 
judgment that lead paint manufacturers were liable under the doctrine of public nuisance for 
knowingly manufacturing and marketing lead paint for indoor use notwithstanding their knowledge 
of its dangers to human health before the federal government banned its use in homes in the 1950s). 
Other jurisdictions have, however, held that lead paint manufacturers could not be held liable under 
their public nuisance doctrines. See, e.g., S a e . Lead Ind s. Ass n., 951 A.2d 428, 453 54 (R.I. 
2008) (holding ha , beca se [ ]he righ  of an indi id al child no  o be poisoned b  lead pain  
is . . . similar o o her e amples of nonp blic righ s,  he s a e had failed to allege the requisite 
in erference i h a p blic righ , hich is reser ed more appropria el  for hose indi isible reso rces 
shared b  he p blic a  large, s ch as air, a er, or p blic righ s of a ,  and does no  e end o a 
widespread interference i h he pri a e righ s of n mero s indi id als ); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d 484, 501 02 (N.J. 2007) (holding that lead paint manufacturers could not be liable for public 
n isance beca se he proper  o ners, ra her han he man fac rers, ere in con rol  of he alleged 
n isance, as lead pain  in b ildings is only a hazard if it is deteriorating, flaking, or otherwise 
dis rbed ). 
177. See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 12 14 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) 
(summarizing the history of the li iga ion and ario s co r s  recep ion o p blic n isance claims). 
178. Recently, hundreds of cities, counties, states, and tribes have filed public nuisance suits against 
opioid manufacturers. See Jackie Fortier, Thi  Ca e Wi  Se  a P ecede : 1  Maj  O i id T ia  
Opens  in  Oklahoma,  NAT L  PUB.  RADIO  (May  27,  2019,  4:21  PM), https://www.npr.org/2019 
/05/27/724093091/this-case-will-set-a-precedent-first-major-opioid-trial-to-begin-in-oklahoma 
[https://perma.cc/CK7Z-NCUM] (reporting on the start of the trial in the case brought by Oklahoma 
against Johnson & Johnson alleging that the company is liable under public nuisance doctrine for its 
marketing practices that contributed to the sta e s opioid addic ion crisis, and no ing ha  he case ill 
set precedent for the hundreds of other pending cases). In late summer of 2019, an Oklahoma trial 
judge found that Johnson & Johnson was liable to the state for creating a public nuisance by fueling 
an opioid epidemic with its marketing practices, and ordered the company to pay the state $572 
million for treatment programs and other expenses incurred as a result of the crisis. See State v. Purdue 
Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, slip op. at 22 25, 29 41 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019); see also 
Karen Savage, After Opioids, Will Climate Change Be the Next Successful Liability Battle?, CLIMATE 
DOCKET (Sept. 12, 2019),  https://www.climatedocket.com/2019/09/12/opioids-liability-climate-
change/ [https://perma.cc/AE6U-K36J] ( In bo h se s of cases, he plain iffs poin  o a long his or  of 
corporate knowledge about the harms their products cause, and concerted efforts to hide that 
kno ledge and profi  from b siness as s al.  (quoting Michael Burger, Exec. Dir., Sabin Ctr. for 
Climate Change L., Columbia Univ.)). 
179. Minneso a brings a n mber of claims nder Minneso a s cons mer pro ec ion s a es. See 
Minnesota Complaint, supra note 141, at 73 82. The District of Columbia filed a climate case the 
day after Minnesota did, and is the first to rely solely on consumer protection statutes. See Complaint 
at 67 77, District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020-CA-002892-B (D.C. Sup. Ct. June 
25, 2020). The nature of the wrongful conduct alleged and of the harms for which the government is 
seeking redress, however, are similar to all the second-wave climate tort cases. 
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second-wave cases180 assert products liability claims. All states have 
developed this now quite rich body of tort law specifically for the purpose 
of addressing harms caused by wrongful manufacture and marketing of 
products.181 These sorts of claims are well-suited to cases, such as the 
second- a e clima e cases, ha  allege a prod c  man fac rer s 
s s ema ic se of a disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence  s ra eg 182 to 
continue profiting from the sale of their products notwithstanding clear 
evidence of their catastrophic nature. 
Given the potential power of the second-wave strategy of relying solely 
on state tort law, and, for the most part, filing in state court, it is not 
surprising that the fossil fuel industry defendants have responded with 
arg men s ha  seek bo h o federali e  he plain iffs  s a e claims and o 
get them before federal courts. 
C. The Defe da  Re e  he Sec d Wa e: Fede a i a i  
of State Tort Law Claims 
All the defendants have responded to these new second-wave state-
foc sed s ra egies b  seeking o federali e  he s a e la  claims, and o 
then reassert the largely successful arguments that resulted in dismissals 
of the first-wave cases. They primarily rely on the one that succeeded 
before the U.S. Supreme Court i.e., displacement. Because only federal 
common law, and not state common law, can be displaced by the Clean 
Air Act or any other federal statute, however, this defense requires a two-
step process. The first step of this new argument is that the state tort claims 
are preemp ed  b  federal common la .183 Specifically, the defendants 
claim ha  he plain iffs  s a e or  claims are based on global-warming 
rela ed inj ries  ha  implica e[] niq el  federal in eres s  and h s 
must be addressed, if at all, under federal common law.184 In all the 
                                                     
180. See Fishermen s Complain , supra note 138, at 80 85; Rhode Island Complaint, supra note 
136, at 120 33; San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, at 81 87; Honolulu Complaint, supra note 
139, at 106 08. 
181. Indeed, state products liability law became so well-developed in the second half of the 
twentieth century that the reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts devoted an entire volume to 
it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (AM. LAW INST. 1998). The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was published around three decades before, contained only one 
section addressing it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
182. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
183. The notices of remo al do no  se he erm preemp ion,  b  his is he proper a  o 
characterize the trumping of state law by federal common law. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 
§ 4515 (rev. 4th ed. April 2020 update). 
184. See Notice of Removal ¶ 5, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 3:17-cv-6011-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
1418 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1383 
 
second-wave cases filed in state court, the defendants have filed a notice 
of removal on this ground.185 With only federal law at stake, the 
defendants argue, they are entitled to remove the cases from the state 
courts in which they were filed. Next, the defendants argue that the federal 
courts should dismiss the cases because the only proper claim the 
federal common law claim is displaced by the Clean Air Act under AEP, 
or, in the alternative, presents a nonjusticiable political question.186 
The argument that state tort climate claims are preempted by federal 
common law has succeeded in two courts so far. In one of the cases 
brought in California state court by Oakland and San Francisco the 
five fossil-fuel industry defendants removed the case, and Northern 
District of California J dge William Als p denied he ci ies  mo ion o 
remand.187 A little less than a month later, on the other side of the country, 
Southern District of New York Judge John Keenan relied on Judge 
Als p s opinion in agreeing i h he defendan s ha  Ne  York Ci s 
state claims were preempted by federal common law.188 In so holding, 
neither judge applied a particular standard, but rather relied on Supreme 
Court cases recognizing that it was appropriate for federal courts to 
develop federal common law to deal with interstate pollution.189 
The plain iffs  s a e claims in hese o cases ere preemp ed b  a 
federal common law claim whose existence was apparently fleeting, 
                                                     
20, 2017). This notice of removal in the case brought by Oakland and San Francisco was the first one 
filed by the second-wave defendants, and the notices filed in all the other suits make the same 
arguments and track the language quoted here. 
185. The city and county of Honolulu filed its complaint shortly before this Article went to press, 
and the defendants have not yet filed a notice of removal in that case. 
186. See, e.g., Defendan s  Mo ion o Dismiss Firs  Amended Complaints; Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities at 8, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 3:17-cv-6011-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) 
( Federal common la  does no  pro ide relief here beca se, in addi ion o o her defec s, Plain iffs  
global warming-based tort claims whether framed as targeting greenhouse gas emissions, oil and 
gas extraction and production, or fossil-fuel product promotion have been displaced by federal 
s a e. ). As e plained infra note 187 and accompanying text, the defendants in California v. BP 
P.L.C. also successfully argued that application of federal common law would be improper based on 
what appears to be a combina ion of he e ra erri oriali  principle de eloped b  he S preme 
Court in the context of the Alien Tort Statute and the political question doctrine. No. C 17-06011 
WHA, 2018 WL 1064293 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The defendants assert a number of other arguments, but 
these are the ones on which they primarily rely and which, as discussed infra in the rest of this section, 
have been the only ones to which the courts have given serious consideration.  
187. See Order Denying Motions to Remand at 8, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 
2018 WL 1064293, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
188. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
189. See id. at 471 (first ci ing In l Paper Co. . O elle e, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); and then citing 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972)); California v. BP P.L.C., 2018 WL 
1064293 at *2 3 (citing and quoting Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91).  
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ho e er. Bo h j dges agreed i h he second s ep of he defendan s  
argument as well, and thus dismissed the federal common law claims that 
he  had j s  concl ded preemp ed he ci ies  s a e claims. Tha  is, 
paradoxically, the federal common law claims existed only long enough 
to preempt the state claims, at which point they were immediately 
displaced by the Clean Air Act. More specifically, both courts held that, 
to the extent that the claims were based on climate harms caused by 
domes ic emissions from he defendan s  fossil f el prod c s, he  ere 
displaced by the Clean Air Act.190 And to the extent that the harms were 
caused by emissions from products outside the United States, the courts 
held that the claims were barred by what appears to be essentially a 
foreign polic  foc sed applica ion of he poli ical q es ion doc rine.191 
Importantly, unlike the Supreme Court in AEP, Judges Alsup and Keenan 
bo h concl ded ha , beca se he plain iffs  s a e claims had alread  been 
preempted, they did not reemerge in the wake of the dismissals of the 
federal common law claims.192 
The other four federal district judges who have thus far addressed the 
second- a e defendan s  federali a ion  arg men Judges Vince 
                                                     
190. See New York, 325 F. S pp. 3d a  474 ( [T]he Ci  alleges ha  i s climate-change related 
injuries are the direct result of the emission of greenho se gases from he comb s ion of Defendan s  
fossil fuels, and not the production and sale of those fossil fuels. Thus, the City ultimately seeks to 
hold Defendants liable for the same conduct at issue in AEP and Kivalina: greenhouse gas 
emissions. . . . Thus, . . . he Ci s claims are displaced. ) (emphasis in original); City of Oakland v. 
BP P.L.C., 325 F. S pp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ( The harm alleged b  o r plain iffs remains 
a harm caused by fossil fuel emissions, not the mere extraction or even sale of fossil fuels. . . . If an 
oil producer cannot be sued under the federal common law for their own emissions, a fortiori they 
canno  be s ed for someone else s. ) (emphasis in original). 
191. See New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 76; Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 28. In opposing 
he defendan s  mo ions o dismiss in hese cases, he plain iffs arg ed ha  he federal common law 
claims were not displaced both because (1) he  ere based on defendan s  prod c ion and sale of 
fossil fuels, and not, like the first-wave cases, on their emissions of greenhouse gases, and (2) their 
damages were caused by the combustion of fossil fuel products all over the world, and the Clean Air 
Act regulates only domestic activities. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. Both courts 
rejected the first distinction, and, although they acknowledged that the Clean Air Act did not displace 
the claims to the extent that they were seeking redress for harms caused by emissions outside the 
United States, both held that the global nature of the claims raised significant foreign policy issues 
appropriately addressed only by the political branches. New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 76 ( Here, 
the City seeks to hold Defendants liable for the emissions that result from their worldwide production, 
marketing, and sale of fossil fuels. . . . Such claims implicate countless foreign governments and their 
laws and policies. . . . [T]he immense and complicated problem of global warming requires a 
comprehensive solution that weighs the global benefits of fossil fuel use with the gravity of the 
impending harms. To litigate such an action . . . in federal court would severely infringe upon the 
foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the purview of the political branches of the U.S. 
Government. Accordingly, the Court will exercise appropriate caution and decline to recognize such 
a ca se of ac ion. ).  
192. See New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474; Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028 29. 
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Chhabria, also of the Northern District of California, Ellen Hollander of 
the District of Maryland, William Smith of the District of Rhode Island, 
and William Martinez of the District of Colorado have concluded that it 
does not provide a basis for federal removal jurisdiction, and accordingly 
remanded to the state courts.193 In doing so, these courts made an 
impor an  dis inc ion ha  he defendan s  arg ment evades and that Judge 
Als p apparen l  o erlooked, namel , ha  be een comple e  and 
ordinar  preemption.194 
Although the defendants in all of the second-wave cases sought 
removal on the basis of federal preemption of state law, in most cases that 
doctrine does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. In almost all 
cases, federal jurisdiction exists, and thus removal is proper, only if a 
federal iss e appears on he face of a ell-pleaded complain . 195 This 
r le, kno n as he ell-pleaded complain  r le,  is long-standing.196 
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, federal preemption of state law is an 
affirmative defense that the state court in which the complaint is filed is 
perfectly capable of addressing.197 The cases in which the Supreme Court 
has departed from this rule and found federal court jurisdiction on 
preemption grounds are few and far between.198 Indeed, there are only 
                                                     
193. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Mayor 
of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 574 (D. Md. 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 
3d 142, 152 (D.R.I. 2019); Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 937, 981 (D. Colo. 
2019). 
194. See San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 938; Mayor of Balt., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 554 58; Rhode 
Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 149 50; Boulder Cnty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 972.  
195. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ( The presence or absence of federal-
q es ion j risdic ion is go erned b  he ell-pleaded complain  r le,  hich pro ides ha  federal 
j risdic ion e is s onl  hen a federal q es ion is presen ed on he face of he plain iff s properl  
pleaded complain . ).  
196. See Lo is ille & Nash ille R.R. Co. . Mo le , 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ( I  is he se led 
interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under 
the Constitution and la s of he Uni ed S a es onl  hen he plain iff s s a emen  of his o n ca se of 
ac ion sho s ha  i  is based pon hose la s or ha  Cons i ion. ). 
197. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) 
( [S]ince 1887 i  has been se led la  ha  a case ma  no  be remo ed o federal co r  on he basis of 
a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the 
plain iff s complain , and e en if bo h par ies admi  ha  he defense is he onl  q es ion r l  a  iss e 
in he case.  (emphasis added)). 
198. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 183, § 4515 ( Al ho gh defendan s  a emp s o remo e a case 
to federal court based on federal preemption generally have been unsuccessful because it is a matter 
of affirmative defense, some courts have concluded that a federal statute can preempt what appears 
to be a state cause of action so completely that removal is available even when the plaintiff never 
invoked federal common law or any other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in the original 
complaint. By virtue of the force of the federal statute, the state claim is treated as if it has been 
replaced b  and in reali  s a ed a federal la  claim. ). 
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three categories of cases in which courts have concluded that so-called 
comple e preemp ion  e is s, hich does pro ide a basis for federal 
question jurisdiction. All three involve areas of law in which federal 
courts have developed common law as necessary to adjudicate claims 
requiring application of comprehensive congressional statutes.199 Thus, all 
four district courts held that any preemption of state law by federal 
common la  alone is ordinar  ra her han comple e,  and accordingl  
can never provide a basis for removal.200 They accordingly remanded the 
cases to state court, where the defendants can and undoubtedly will
asser  ordinar  preemp ion as an affirma i e defense.201 
The plaintiffs in Oakland and the defendants in San Mateo appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the plaintiffs in New York to the 
Second Circuit. The defendants in the Colorado, Rhode Island, and 
Baltimore cases all appealed the remand orders, bringing the issue before 
the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits as well. As of this writing, the 
Fourth,202 Ninth,203 and Tenth204 Circuits have decided the cases. The 
Fourth and Tenth Circuit panels, as well as the Ninth Circuit panel in its 
decision in the San Mateo case, did not address the question of 
preemption complete or ordinary. Rather, they all held that the only 
basis on which defendan s ma  appeal a dis ric  co r s remand order 
under 28 U.S.C § 1447 is federal officer  remo al j risdic ion, and ha  
the fossil fuel companies had failed to establish that basis.205 Although the 
                                                     
199. See id. § 3722.2 (e plaining ha  [b]eca se of he ob io s federalism implica ions of he 
complete-preemp ion doc rine, he co r s ha e limi ed i s applica ion  o ac ions nder he Labor 
Relations Management Act and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, and to claims 
against banks chartered under the National Bank Act). 
200. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Mayor 
of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 554 58 (D. Md. 2019); Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 
405 F. Supp. 3d 937, 981 (D. Colo. 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 149
50 (D.R.I. 2019) ( Wi ho  a federal s a e ielding or authorizing the federal courts to wield
e raordinar  pre-emp i e po er,  here can be no comple e preemp ion.  (q o ing Me ro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)); Mayor of Balt., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 557 (citing Gil Seinfeld, 
Climate Change Litigation in the Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Lessons from California v. BP, 117 
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 32 35 (2018)) (rel ing on Seinfeld s renchan  cri iq e of J dge Als p s 
opinion). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 172 174. 
202. Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 952 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2020). 
203. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron 
Corp., 960 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2020). 
204. Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, No. 19-1330, 2020 WL 3777996 (10th Cir. July 7, 2020). 
205. See id. at *17, *23; San Mateo, 960 F.3d at 598, 603; Mayor of Balt., 952 F.3d a  457 ( [T]his 
decision is only about whether one path to federal court lies open. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 
confines our appellate jurisdiction, the narrow question before us is whether removal of this lawsuit 
is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, commonly referred to as the federal officer removal statute. 
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defendan s ha e asser ed federal officer  as a basis of federal court 
jurisdiction in all of the second-wave cases, none of the district court 
judges including Judge Alsup have agreed with that argument. The 
defendan s in Bal imore s case immedia el  filed a pe i ion for ri  of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court, arg ing ha  he Fo r h Circ i s 
precedent interpreting § 1447 as permitting review of only federal officer 
removal jurisdiction, and not of any other jurisdictional bases asserted by 
a defendant, falls on the wrong side of a circuit split on the issue.206 
The same Nin h Circ i  panel heard he plain iffs  appeal of J dge 
Als p s decision finding federal j risdic ion, and held ha  he erred in 
finding federal-question jurisdiction because the defendants had failed to 
establish either of the two exceptions to he ell-pleaded complain  
rule ha  he plain iff s s a e or  claim of n isance raised a s bs an ial 
federal q es ion 207 or was completely preempted by a federal law.208 
Judge Alsup did not decide on any of the other bases for removal that the 
defendants had asserted; however, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court to decide whether any of the other bases were proper.209 
Regardless ho  he S preme Co r  r les on he ind s r s pe i ion in 
Bal imore s case, he iss e of preemp ion of he state climate claims by 
federal common law is likely to eventually come before the Court. The 
q es ion of comple e preemp ion as irrele an  o J dge Keenan s 
anal sis in Ne  York Ci s case since he ci  originall  filed i s s a e 
claims as a diversity action in federal court. Thus, the Second Circuit will 
have to address the question of whether Judge Keenan correctly concluded 
that the state climate claims are preempted by federal common law under 
ordinar  preemp ion anal sis.210 The defendants will almost certainly 
assert the defense in the state courts in California, Rhode Island, 
Bal imore, Colorado, Ha ai i, Minneso a, and, l ima el , in all he o her 
second-wave cases that may still be filed. That is, all the courts will 
probably face the question of whether federal common law preempts the 
state climate claims their answers, and, ultimately that of the Supreme 
Court may decide the future of climate tort litigation. 
                                                     
And . . . . because we conclude that § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal, we affirm the 
dis ric  co r s remand order. ).  
206. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2 3, BP v. Mayor of Balt., No. 19-1189 (Mar. 31, 2020).  
207. Oakland, 960 F.3d at 580 81. 
208. Id. at 581 82. 
209. Id. at 585. 
210. As Judge Hollander pointed out in her thoughtful and exhaustive opinion, the New York 
dis ric  co r s anal sis as inapposi e, since ha  he co r  did no  consider he her [i s finding ha  
federal common law preemp ed Ne  York Ci s s a e claims] conferred federal q es ion j risdic ion 
beca se he plain iffs originall  filed heir complain  in federal co r  based on di ersi  j risdic ion.  
Mayor of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 557 (D. Md. 2019). 
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As he ini ial j dicial responses o he defendan s  preemp ion 
argument indicate, the proper analysis of the issue whether state tort law 
is preempted by the federal common law of nuisance is far from clear. 
This is perhaps not surprising given that there are only a handful of key 
Supreme Court federal common law nuisance cases. In most of them, the 
Court is just as if not more concerned with the question whether it 
should exercise its original jurisdiction. In light of the second-wave 
defendan s  federali a ion  defense s ra eg , ho e er, he q es ion of 
preemption of state tort law by federal common law sorely 
needs clarification. 
III. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW CLAIM OF PUBLIC 
NUISANCE AND STATE TORT LAW 
There is a significant amount of case law on the preemption of state 
law by federal statutory law, and the analytical framework for analyzing 
the issue is well-established.211 In contrast, the Supreme Court has never 
directly addressed the issue of how to properly determine whether federal 
common law preempts state law.212 When the Court has stated that there 
are issues of special federal interest that should be governed by federal 
common law rather than state common law it has done so mainly with 
the goal of justifying the rare exercise of federal judicial power to make 
and apply federal common law, rather than leaving the matter to resolution 
by state tort law. Indeed, such justification is called for given that the 
Court held over eighty years ago that state tort law is appropriate in the 
vast majority of cases. 
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,213 the Supreme Court put federal 
co r s o  of he b siness of fashioning federal general common la ,  
reasoning that such lawmaking is not within the federal judicial power: 
Congress has no po er o declare s bs an i e r les of common la  
applicable in a state . . . [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to 
confer s ch a po er pon federal co r s. 214 In the wake of Erie, however, 
the Court has recognized limited situations in which federal common law 
                                                     
211. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. . S a e Energ  Res. Conser a ion & De . Comm n, 461 U.S. 
190, 203 04 (1983) (setting out the well-established three ways in which Congress can preempt state 
law: express, field, and obstacle preemption); Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort 
Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) ( As federal law making and federal regulation have 
increased in size and importance, so too has the doctrine of federal preemp ion. ). 
212. As noted supra, note 19, the focus of this Article is on federal common law outside of the 
maritime area. 
213. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
214. Id. at 78. 
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should govern. When it has done so, however, it has taken care to justify 
departure from Erie based on the federal judicial role in U.S. 
constitutional structure in light of the specific nature of the case at hand.215 
In recognizing its authority to establish a federal common law doctrine 
of nuisance, the Supreme Court has primarily relied on the interstate 
nature of the disputes in which it has applied the doctrine, rather than on 
the idea that environmental harms presented issues that were necessarily 
federal  in na re.216 In one of its earliest federal nuisance cases, which 
involved a claim brought by Missouri against Illinois seeking to abate 
sewage discharges from Chicago into a river that fed into the Mississippi 
River, the Court stated: 
It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a state 
upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a 
casus belli for a state lower down, unless removed. If such a 
nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi, the 
controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a 
suit in this court.217 
Similarly but somewhat less dramatically, around seven decades later 
in another case in which a state brought suit to abate sewage discharges 
from another state, he Co r  no ed: When e deal i h air and a er in 
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is federal common law . . . . 218 
That some federal common law has survived Erie, however, does not 
mean that every claim by a jurisdiction alleging that it suffered harm 
caused by activities that took place outside of it must be a federal common 
law claim. Indeed, in some of the same cases in which the Court has 
recognized the propriety of federal common law, it has also recognized 
the possibility that state common law may be applicable. In its pre-Erie 
                                                     
215. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 183, § 4514 ( To some extent, each exercise of 
federal common lawmaking is sui generis in that it is the product of the unique interplay of specific 
statutory or constitutional language, case-sensitive federal policy concerns, and other case-specific 
fac ors.  (emphasis added)). 
216. See generally id. § 4517 (in explaining the development of federal common law nuisance 
doc rine, no ing ha  he Co r  had concl ded ha  cases in ol ing disp es o er in ers a e 
bo ndaries, s reams, air, or a er poll ion presen  federal q es ions  appropriately resolved by 
federal common la  go ern[ing] in ers a e proprie ar  and ecological con ro ersies ).  
217. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 21 (1906); see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ( When he s a es b  heir nion made he forcible aba emen  of o side 
nuisances, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the 
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign 
in eres s; and he al erna i e o force is a s i  in his co r . ). Cas s belli  is a La in phrase meaning 
an e en  or ac ion hat justifies . . . a ar.  Casus belli, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/casus%20belli [https://perma.cc/NB9L-AYQU]. 
218. Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). 
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nuisance cases, the Court adjudicated the claims, which were brought by 
a state against another state or the citizens thereof, in the exercise of its 
original jurisdiction.219 As a result, the question of the role of state law in 
such cases did not arise until after both Erie and the enactment of federal 
environmental legislation. Section A lays out how the Court has dealt with 
that issue so far and the significant questions that remain about the 
appropriate way to deal with it. Section B provides a recommendation for 
a clear rule based on the relevant case law so far and principles 
of federalism. 
A. What Little We Know about Preemption of State Nuisance Law by 
Federal Nuisance Law 
In the 1972 case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I),220 Illinois 
in oked he S preme Co r s original j risdic ion o enjoin ci ies and 
municipal agencies in Wisconsin from discharging untreated and 
improperly treated sewage into Lake Michigan.221 The Court declined to 
exercise its original jurisdiction, in part because federal common law is 
federal law for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, so the 
federal dis ric  co r  pro ided a en e for Illinois s claim.222 That was not 
the end of the matter for the Court, however there is a Milwaukee II,  
Milwaukee v. Illinois.223 Shortly after Illinois refiled in district court, 
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA).224 The district court 
concl ded ha  he CWA did no  displace he s a e s federal common la  
claim, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and held that the lower courts were wrong.225 Congress, the 
Court concluded, had displaced federal common law nuisance claims 
in ol ing a er poll ion b  speaking direc l  o he iss e in he 
CWA.226 In so holding, the Court emphasized the highly limited nature of 
federal common law in the U.S. constitutional structure. The Court noted 
ha  i  is s a e, and no  federal, co r s ha  possess a general po er o 
                                                     
219. See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236, 240; Missouri, 200 U.S. at 517.  
220. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
221. Id. at 93. 
222. See id. a  98, 100, 108 ( While his original s i  normall  migh  be he appropria e ehicle for 
resolving this controversy, we exercise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district 
court . . . . ). 
223. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
224. Id. at 310. 
225. Id. at 310 12. 
226. Id. at 315, 332. 
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de elop and appl  heir o n r les of decision. 227 Accordingl , [ ]he 
enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision 
whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the 
federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but 
by the people thro gh heir elec ed represen a i es in Congress. 228 As a 
res l , hile s a e common la  is ro ine, 229 federal common la  is a 
necessar  e pedien  and n s al e ercise of la making b  
federal co r s. 230 
Beca se s a es  la making po er is so m ch grea er han that of the 
federal co r s, he Co r  rejec ed Illinois s arg men  ha  he q es ion 
whether Congress had displaced federal common law was governed by 
the same analysis as the question whether Congress had preempted state 
law.231 The Court will assume that state law is not preempted unless that 
is he clear and manifes  p rpose of Congress. 232 In contrast, it is not 
necessar  ha  Congress affirma i el  proscribe[] he se of federal 
common la  for i  o be displaced, b  ra her onl  ha  Congress sp[eak] 
direc l  o a q es ion  pre io sl  go erned b  federal common la .233 
Given the difference in the stringency of these standards, it necessarily 
follows that legislation may displace federal common law but leave state 
law  including state common law intact. The Supreme Court reached 
this conclusion in its next federal common law nuisance case, also 
involving interstate water pollution: International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette.234 
In International Paper, landowners in Vermont on the shore of Lake 
Champlain sued a pulp and paper mill (IPC) located on the New York side 
of the lake, alleging that IPC was liable for nuisance under Vermont 
common law for the discharge of pollutants into the lake.235 IPC 
responded that the CWA preempted the state nuisance claim; the district 
court and Second Circuit disagreed.236 The Supreme Court held that the 
                                                     
227. Id. at 312. 
228. Id. at 312 13 (emphasis added). 
229. Id. at 329. 
230. Id. at 314. 
231. See id. a  316 ( Con rar  o he s gges ion of responden s, he appropria e anal sis in 
determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject of federal common law 
is not the same at that employed in deciding if federal law pre-empts s a e la . ). 
232. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
233. Id. at 315. 
234. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
235. Id. at 483 84. The landowners filed their claim in Vermont state court, and IPC removed it. 
236. See id. at 484 87. 
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CWA preempted a Vermont nuisance claim, but not a New York nuisance 
claim.237 Beca se he CWA specifically allows source States to impose 
stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the 
reg la or  par nership es ablished b  he [s a e]. 238 Importantly, that 
necessarily means that state common law is not preempted by the CWA 
even though, as the Court held in Milwaukee II, that statute displaces all 
federal common law claims involving interstate water pollution. In 
making his concl sion, he Co r  relied on he CWA s sa ings cla se,239 
which, as discussed above, is substantively similar to that in the Clean 
Air Act.240 
The logic of he Co r s decision in International Paper makes sense 
given that, as the Milwaukee II Court emphasized, federal common law is 
much more readily displaced by federal legislation than state law is 
preempted thereby. This is not the part of the decision that the defendants 
rely on to support their argument for preemption of the state climate 
claims by federal common law, however. They rely on the International 
Paper Co r s ra her p ling charac eri a ion of he impor  of 
Milwaukee I. In holding that the federal common law of nuisance applied, 
the Milwaukee I Court was primarily focused on justifying its decision to 
den  Illinois s req es  ha  he Co r  e ercise i s original j risdic ion, and 
h s on he na re of federal common la  as federal la  for p rposes 
of federal question jurisdiction.241 The Court did not directly address the 
issue of the possible availability of state court claims. Rather, in a footnote 
accompan ing i s concl sion ha  federal la  go erns, 242 the 
Court stated: 
                                                     
237. See id. at 498 99 (in j s if ing i s concl sion ha  An ac ion bro gh  agains  IPC nder Ne  
York nuisance law would not frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit governed by Vermont 
la ,  he Co r  e plained he reg la or  frame ork es ablished he CWA based on he Na ional 
Permi  Discharge Elimina ion S s em: Firs , applica ion of he so rce S a e s la  does no  dis rb 
the balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests. Because the Act specifically 
allows source States to impose stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt 
the regulatory partnership established by the permit system. Second, the restriction of suits to those 
brought under source-state nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an indeterminate 
number of potential regulations. Although New York nuisance law may impose separate standards 
and thus create some tension with the permit system, a source only is required to look to a single 
additional authority, whose rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can be expected 
o ake in o acco n  heir o n n isance la s in se ing permi  req iremen s ). 
238. Id. at 499.   
239. Id. a  497 ( The sa ing cla se specificall  preser es o her s a e ac ions, and herefore no hing 
in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source 
S a e. ) (emphasis in orginal). 
240. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e); supra text accompanying notes 173 174. 
241. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.  
242. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
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Federal common law and not the varying common law of the 
individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be 
recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the 
environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by 
sources outside its domain . . . . And the logic and practicality of 
regarding such claims as being entitled to be asserted within the 
federal-question jurisdiction . . . would seem to be self-evident.243 
Citing this footnote, the International Paper Court explained that the 
implici  corollar  of he Milwaukee I Co r s de ermina ion ha  federal 
la  go erned as ha  s a e common la  as preemp ed. 244 The Court 
does not explain, however, how state law that was preempted by federal 
law before the enactment of the CWA could be resurrected after its 
enactment displaced federal common law. And in neither International 
Paper, nor any of its other federal common law nuisance cases, has the 
Court articulated a clear standard for determining whether federal 
common law preempts state common law. Rather, we are left to flesh out 
he implici  corollar  of a 1972 opinion i h ag e references o he 
need for a federal niform  s andard and he general idea of 
environmental nuisances that cross state lines. 
Now, almost five decades later, this absence of a meaningful standard 
has become a problem. The fossil fuel industry defendants have made 
ha  has here ofore been an implici  corollar ,  co pled i h ag e 
references o he na ional  and federal  na re of the problem of climate 
disr p ion,  par  of heir primar  defense in he second-wave cases. And 
two district courts have agreed with them. 
In the following section, this Article proposes a rule that is the most 
logical in ligh  of he S preme Co r s relevant federal common law 
nuisance cases and the most consistent with general principles 
of federalism. 
B. Bringing Clarity to Preemption of State Nuisance Law by Federal 
Common Law 
AEP is the most recent case in which the Supreme Court has addressed 
the question whether a federal common law nuisance claim is displaced 
and the relationship between federal common law and state common law. 
As noted above, the AEP Court confirmed that federal common law is 
displaced if Congress has spoken direc l  o he iss e.245 The Court also 
                                                     
243. Id. at 107 n.9. 
244. In l Paper Co. . O elle e, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987). 
245. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) ( The es  for he her 
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confirmed that a decision that federal common law is displaced does not 
mean that state common law is preempted, as that is a different and 
much more exacting inquiry.246 Thus, after holding that the federal 
nuisance claim in that case was displaced by the CAA, the AEP Court 
s a ed ha , as [n]one of he par ies ha e briefed preemp ion or o her ise 
addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance 
law . . . [w]e . . . lea e he ma er open for considera ion on remand. 247 
The Court also noted that the Second Circuit had not addressed the 
q es ion he her he CAA preemp ed he plain iffs  s a e claims beca se 
i  held ha  federal common la  go erned. 248 In making this point, the 
Court cited International Paper and included the following quote in the 
accompan ing paren he ical: if a case sho ld be resol ed b  reference o 
federal common law[,] . . . s a e common la  [is] preemp ed. 249 The 
implication is that if a federal claim is displaced, state claims may 
still exist. 
Thus, the Milwaukee I Milwaukee II International Paper line of 
reasoning means that Judges Alsup and Keenan were wrong in concluding 
ha  he plain iffs  s a e claims did no  reemerge af er hose j dges 
concluded that the federal common law claim was displaced. On the one 
hand, there is arguably some logic to the idea that state claims do not 
reemerge after being preempted by federal common law. On the other 
hand, it seems odd that federal common law, which disappears merely if 
Congress direc l  speaks o an iss e,  can preempt state claims that are 
pres med no  o be preemp ed b  legisla ion nless here is e idence of 
a clear and manifes  [congressional] p rpose  o do so.250 
Ra her han an implici  corollar  based on ag e ideas abo  he need 
for national uniformity, interstate environmental nuisances, and so on, the 
question of preemption of state common law by federal common law 
should, if anything, be governed by a more exacting standard than 
preemption of state law by federal statutes. Crafting such a standard is 
                                                     
congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the 
s a e speak[s] direc l  o [ he] q es ion  a  iss e.  (q o ing Mobil Oil Corp. . Higginbo ham, 436 
U.S. 618, 625 (1978))). 
246. See id. a  423, 429 ( Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require the 
same sor  of e idence of a clear and manifes  [congressional] p rpose  demanded for preemp ion of 
state law.  (al era ion in original) (q o ing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981))); id. ( In light of 
our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the availability vel non of a state 
lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. ). 
247. Id. at 429. 
248. Id. at 429. 
249. Id. at 429 (quoting I  Pa e , 479 U.S. at 488). 
250. Id. at 423 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317). 
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diffic l  if no  impossible, ho e er, beca se he o chs one  of he 
congressional preemption standard is congressional intent.251 There is no 
such intent to divine when it comes to federal common law, which is an 
n s al e ercise of la making po er  b  federal courts that they resort 
o onl  as a necessar  e pedien  in limi ed cases.252 Indeed, the idea that 
law of that sort can preempt state tort law is in tension with the 
constitutional rationale underlying the congressional preemption 
standard namely, protecting the U.S. federal system of government. As 
he Co r  has repea edl  s a ed: [W]e s ar  i h he ass mp ion ha  he 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress  
so o r anal sis [ ill] incl de[] d e regard for he pres pposi ions of o r 
embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power 
not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of 
democrac . 253 Developing an equally stringent standard much less a 
more exacting one is not possible with federal common law, which 
federal courts do not make with the sort of intent that Congress does when 
it legislates and for which it is accountable. Particularly in a post-Erie 
world, then, the only way out of this doctrinal dilemma is to recognize 
preemption of state tort claims only by federal statutes, and not by the thin 
body of federal common law that federal judges have essentially been out 
of the business of making and applying for over eight decades. Indeed, 
to allow preemption of state law by federal common would turn Erie on 
its head. 
Importantly, the idea that federal common law might preempt state tort 
la  and he concomi an  ideas of he federal in eres s  implica ed b  
in ers a e en ironmen al n isances did no  emerge in he Co r s federal 
common law nuisance cases until after Erie, when the Court had to justify 
its decision to apply federal common law rather than the applicable state 
or  la . In he Co r s pre-Erie nuisance cases, all of which were based 
on its diversity jurisdiction, there was no need for such justifications; the 
Court proceeded directly to the merits of the nuisance claims.254 In 
Milwaukee I the post-Erie case ha  is he so rce of he implici  
corollar  ha  s a e or  la  ma  be preemp ed b  federal common la
                                                     
251. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
252. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. 
253. Id. at 316 (first quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); and then 
quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)). 
254. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 39 (1907) (enjoining a copper smelting 
compan  in Tennessee from discharging no io s gas  o er Georgia s erri or ); Misso ri . Illinois, 
200 U.S. 496, 517, 526 (1906) (declining to issue an injunction after concluding that Missouri was 
unable to prove that the typhoid bacillus polluting the Mississippi River near St. Louis originated 
from Chicago sewage). 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
2020] SEEKING CLIMATE JUSTICE IN STATE TORT LAW 1431 
 
the Court primarily emphasized the need to ensure that states had the 
ability to protect the air and water on which their residents depended, even 
if the state was unable to bring a nuisance suit under its own tort law and 
in its own courts because of the location of the polluter: 
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of 
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree 
to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the 
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their 
still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to 
force is a suit in this court.255 
It may be that there are similar situations in which courts should 
recognize federal common law nuisance claims. But where, as in the 
second-wave climate cases, plaintiffs properly plead and bring state 
claims in state court, they should never be deemed preempted by federal 
common law alone. Indeed, the second-wave cases demonstrate that 
allowing preemption by federal common law alone would be inconsistent 
with Erie rationale. After all, the Court justified its pronouncement in that 
case ha  i  as a fallac  o appl  general federal common la  in 
diversity cases rather than the applicable state law for two reasons: first, 
because doing so permitted noncitizens believing a federal rule of decision 
would be more favorable to them to simply remove based on diversity 
jurisdiction,256 and second, because states and Congress, and not federal 
courts, have lawmaking authority under the Constitution.257 The fossil fuel 
ind s r  defendan s  la es  strategy of removing cases to federal court 
based on federal q es ion j risdic ion (and, in Ne  York Ci s case, 
turning the state claims alleged in federal court into a federal claims) 
presen s he same hrea  o s a es  abili  o de elop and appl  heir own 
common la  and o heir residen s  abili  o in oke i .258 
                                                     
255. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972) (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237). 
256. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76 (1938) ( [D]iscrimina ion res l ed from he 
wide range of person held entitled to avail themselves of the federal rule by resort to the diversity of 
ci i enship j risdic ion. ). 
257. See id. at 78 79 ( E cep  in ma ers go erned b  he Federal Cons i ion or b  ac s of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is that of the state. . . . Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . be they commercial law or a part of the law 
of or s. ). 
258. In his opinion for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis strongly condemned the game playing to 
secure a federal forum that took place in the pre-Erie case: Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 74 ( Bro n & Yello , a Ken cky 
corporation owned by Kentuckians, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, also a Kentucky 
corporation, wished that the former should have the exclusive privilege of soliciting passenger and 
baggage transportation at [a Kentucky] Railroad station; and that the Black & White, a competing 
Kentucky corporation, should be prevented from interfering with that privilege. Knowing that such a 
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Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, this second-wave 
defense strategy is ultimately simply a generalized argument that any sort 
of claim relating to anthropogenic climate disruption does not belong in a 
court, but rather is for the political branches to address, or to not address. 
As the discussion above in Part II shows, that logic underlies every 
successful first-wave strategy standing, political question, and 
displacement. In accepting this generalized argument that is at best
loosely moored to the various doctrines on which it has purportedly been 
based, most of the first-wave courts and two of the second-wave courts 
have entirely failed to meaningfully engage with the nature of the 
common law claims before them. 
Even though these claims are about climate harms, they are asking 
courts to do what courts have done in many different situations throughout 
U.S. history: hold responsible parties accountable for wrongfully causing 
legally cognizable harms. Yes, the current historical situation happens to 
be a global, national, and local emergency that leaves no facet of life 
untouched. And yes, courts are unable to respond to that emergency in the 
way that policymakers can and must. But that does not mean the courts 
have no role to play in the legal response to the climate crisis. To the 
contrary, it means that facing their obligation to play a role by allowing 
these claims to be heard is all the more essential. In the wake of the first 
wave, this obligation now rests with state courts. 
IV. THE URGENT NEED FOR CLIMATE STATE TORT CLAIMS 
Pre en ing he federali a ion  of he s a e or  clima e claims b  
disallowing preemption by federal common law is not only, as argued in 
Part III, the better result as a legal matter. It is also the better result as a 
policy matter. For at least two reasons, it is important that the plaintiffs be 
allowed to litigate their climate tort claims now i.e., when climate tort 
claims are so powerful, the climate emergency is only becoming more 
devastating, and the fossil fuel industry is continuing to fuel the crisis by 
con in ing i s disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence  s ra eg . The ne  
two sections address each reason in turn. 
                                                     
contract would be void under the common law of Kentucky, it was arranged that the Brown & Yellow 
reincorporate under the law of Tennessee, and that the contract with the railroad should be executed 
there. The suit was then brought by the Tennessee corporation in the federal court for Western 
Kentucky to enjoin competition by the Black & White; an injunction issued by the District Court was 
sustained by the Court of Appeals; and this Court, citing many decisions in which the doctrine of 
Swift & Tyson had been applied, affirmed he decree. ). The fossil f el ind s r  defendan s  a emp s 
to remove the second-wave cases are very much the same sort of game playing.  
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A. The Much Greater Suitability of State Tort Law to the Second-
Wave Claims than Federal Common Law 
State tort law is a much richer body of law than the federal common 
law of nuisance, which has not developed much since the beginning of the 
twentieth century because of Erie. Consequently, federal common law is 
ill-suited to the second-wave claims. The state nuisance claims are 
different from the federal common law nuisance claims alleged by the 
first-wave plaintiffs, and, indeed, from all of federal common law 
nuisance claims based on pollution that the Supreme Court has addressed. 
The second- a e clima e claims allege ha  he defendan s  marke ing of 
fossil fuel products was tortious not, like the first-wave climate tort 
cases or all other federal nuisance claims in Supreme Court cases, the 
defendan s  emissions or o her pes of poll an  discharge. F r her, as 
noted above, the plaintiffs in some of the second-wave cases allege not 
only state nuisance claims, but also several products liability claims that 
are unavailable in federal common law. 259 
The second-wave climate tort suits are based on extensive, robust 
scientific evidence of the causal link between combustion of fossil fuel 
products and anthropogenic climate disruption.260 Additionally, the 
plaintiffs have evidence supporting the specific, large contributions of 
each par ic lar defendan s prod c s o he o al an hropogenic 
greenhouse gas produced over time, and thus, to climate disruption.261 
Finall , he  ha e e ensi e doc men a ion of he defendan s  kno ledge 
of their contribution to the climate crisis and its devastating consequences 
and their response to that knowledge; namely, a concerted disinformation 
campaign abo  an hropogenic disr p ion of he Ear h s clima e s s em 
and its connection to fossil fuel use, coupled with an acceleration of their 
businesses to further entrench societal dependence on fossil fuels. 
Although there is a strong argument that such evidence would support a 
federal nuisance claim, it would be a relatively novel claim. That is not 
the case with state tort law, which is much better equipped to handle 
                                                     
259. See Minnesota Complaint, supra note 141, at 74 76 (failure to warn); Honolulu Complaint, 
supra note 139, at 106 10 (failure to warn); Rhode Island Complaint, supra note 136, at 121 33 
(design defec  and fail re o arn); Fishermen s Complain , supra note 138, at 82 85, 88 89 (design 
defect and failure to warn); San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, at 81 87 (design defect and failure 
to warn). 
The ability to allege multiple claims in this way does not, of course, allow for multiple damage 
awards; plaintiffs can recover only once for a given injury. But it does in many cases give plaintiffs 
the opportunity to more fully describe and thus voice their opposition to conduct that they claim 
has unlawfully harmed them.  
260. See supra section II.A. 
261. See supra section II.A. 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
1434 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1383 
 
claims that allege liability for wrongful marketing of products. 
Extension of theories of tort liability to deceptive marketing practices 
is among the most important developments in the evolution of state tort 
law in response to widespread public harms. Unlike federal common law, 
this development of state tort law has only accelerated since Erie. In the 
1960s, state courts throughout the nation began drawing on existing tort 
law principles in response to new types of business activities by large 
companies including mass-marketing of their products, engaging in 
misleading marketing strategies, and selling unsafe products with the 
potential to cause widespread and devastating harms. In so doing, state 
courts have recognized that, in an era of corporate national marketing 
campaigns that make representations of products essential to what 
consumers perceive the products to be, tort law must be able to address 
harms that are caused not by isolated instances of individual actions, but 
rather from systematic activities of corporations. This is the sort of 
conduct and harms that state courts have been addressing in their tort law 
for over half a century now; federal courts applying the very limited 
federal common law of nuisance have not.262 In this regard, the recent 
clima e or  claims based on he fossil f el ind s r s prod c  
manufacturing and marketing are not novel for state tort law. 
In sum, in contrast to the federal common law of nuisance which 
developed to respond to the limited situation of interstate pollution 
disputes state common law claims have increasingly been used to 
mitigate the local consequences of corporate conduct that may have 
widespread impacts throughout the rest of the nation, or indeed, the world. 
It is unquestionably not the only, or even the best, way to address these 
consequences. But it does not have to be in order to be justified or, indeed, 
to be one essential means of addressing such problems. This is the second 
reason that disallowing preemption of state tort law by federal common 
law alone is the right result as a matter of policy, as explained the 
next section. 
B. The Significance of State Tort Climate Litigation as Part of the 
U.S. Legal Response to the Climate Crisis 
State tort law has long provided a critical way in which individuals and 
entities can hold others accountable for causing injury and secure redress 
for those injuries. Particularly since the mid-twentieth century, individuals 
and communities have sought compensation for harms caused by national 
                                                     
262. Relatedly, because state tort law is usually applicable and federal common law exceptional, 
state judges have significantly more expertise with common law and its development than federal 
judges do. 
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and multinational for-profit entities whose widespread commercial 
activities harm the health and well-being of humans and their 
environment, usually when the political branches have left such activities 
virtually unchecked. This makes it a particularly powerful tool for 
communities who are most vulnerable to the harms caused by corporate 
misconduct but who lack the sort of political or economic power that 
might help them secure some measure of protection at the national level. 
The pathbreaking litigation seeking redress for climate harms may prove 
to be the most important example to date of this function of the tort system 
at work.263 
As noted above, the second-wave plaintiffs have strong evidence of the 
fossil fuel industry defendants  decep i e marke ing in their 
complaints.264 If the cases get to discovery, there will undoubtedly be 
f r her re ela ions abo  he e en  of defendan s  kno ledge abo  he 
climate harms that the use of their products was causing and their 
disinformation campaigns in response. Additionally, if allowed to 
proceed, these cases will provide a much-needed governmental venue for 
providing information about climate science. Such venues are particularly 
essential now, when the Trump Administration is systematically 
suppressing climate science and its implications265 across agencies, 
including the EPA,266 Department of Interior,267 Department of 
                                                     
263. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV T L. 1, 71 
(2011). ( Ideas abo  . . . tort law must continually interact with the raw realities of human suffering 
and with . . . institutions that address such suffering . . . . [S]uch a complex and contingent matrix 
does not lend itself readily to prediction, but if scientists are even remotely correct in their assessment 
of harms to be expected from greenhouse gas emissions, then climate change will enter prominently 
in o or  la s e ol ionar  d namics. ). 
264. See supra section II.A. 
265. See generally, e.g., JACOB CARTER ET AL., THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION: DAMAGES DONE, LESSONS LEARNED, AND A PATH TO PROGRESS 15 (2019) 
( [T]he Tr mp administration has repeatedly ignored, dismissed, or suppressed the science of climate 
change, limiting the ability of federal scientists to speak about, report on, or even study it. The 
administration has also removed, revoked, and suppressed mentions of climate change in agency 
documents and pointed instead to elements of uncertainty about the magnitude of impacts and the 
human causes of climate change rather than the overwhelming U.S. and international consensus on 
its very significant risks and the unequivocal evidence that recent warming is primarily caused by 
h man ac i i ies. ). 
266. See id. a  17 (s a ing ha  [c]lima e science is . . . absent or has been removed from critical 
science-based policies a  he EPA,  and pro iding e amples of his in r lemakings). 
267. See Robbie Gramer, T  Shad  Wa   C i a e Scie ce, FOREIGN POL Y (July 31, 
2019, 3:38 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/trumps-shadow-war-on-climate-science-state-
department-intelligence-analyst-resigns-white-house-muzzles-intelligence-assessment-climate-
change-environment/ [https://perma.cc/Y6GC-X2Q7] (quoting a climate scientist who lost her 
position a  he Na ional Park Ser ice beca se she as a clima e scien is  in a clima e-denying 
adminis ra ion,  and repor ing ha  a former senior official a  he Depar men  of In erior described a 
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Agriculture,268 and State Department.269 
The Tr mp Adminis ra ion s s s ema ic s ppression of clima e science 
is part of the way it supports its efforts to dismantle the climate protections 
that were in place and to justify its refusal to provide the much more 
extensive protections that are necessary270 while accelerating approval 
                                                     
c l re of fear, censorship, and s ppression  i hin he Tr mp adminis ra ion on clima e science,  
and said ha  s dies on he heal h impac s of coal mining and chemicals in drinking a er ha e been 
m led or dela ed and he phrase clima e change  s ripped from repor s ). 
268. See Helena Bottemiller Evich, Agricultural Department Buries Studies Showing Dangers of 
Climate  Change,  POLITICO  (June  23,  2019,  5:04  PM),  https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/ 
23/agriculture-department-climate-change-1376413 [https://perma.cc/XRN7-8JFB] (finding the 
Tr mp Adminis ra ion s ppressed do ens of go ernmen -funded studies that carry warnings about 
the effects of climate change, defying a longstanding practice of touting such findings by the 
Agriculture Departmen s acclaimed in-ho se scien is s  and hese findings re ealed a persis en  
pattern in which the Trump administration refused to draw attention to findings that show the potential 
dangers and consequences of climate change, covering dozens of separate studies. The 
adminis ra ion s mo es flo  decades of depar men  prac ice of promo ing i s research in he spiri  of 
educating farmers and consumers around the world, according to an analysis of USDA 
comm nica ions nder pre io s adminis ra ions ); Helena Bo emiller Evich, I  Fee  Like 
Something Out of a Bad Sci-Fi M ie , POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:14 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/05/ziska-usda-climate-agriculture-trump-1445271 
[https://perma.cc/VU68-CW95] (Lewis Ziska, a leading climate scientist who authored one of those 
studies one about how rice is losing nutrients because of rising CO2 levels resigned after the 
Tr mp Adminis ra ion q es ioned his findings and ried o minimi e media co erage of he paper.  
Ziska, who had worked at the USDA s Research Ser ice for o er en  ears, old a Poli ico repor er 
ha  he a mosphere a  he agenc  had changed drama icall  af er Tr mp s elec ion in 2016: An  
[research] related to climate change was seen as extremely vulnerable. . . . No one wanted to say 
clima e change, o  o ld sa  clima e ncer ain  or o  o ld sa  e reme e en s.  Or o  o ld 
se ha e er e phemism as a ailable o no  dra  a en ion. ). 
269. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Intelligence Aid, Blocked from Submitting Written Testimony on 




newsletter&utm_term=.9d787aa7564b [https://perma.cc/A29N-NY69] (reporting the Trump 
Adminis ra ion s ref sal o allo  a State Department scientist to submit written testimony to the 
House Intelligence Committee because the administration objected to statements about the national 
sec ri  hrea s presen ed b  clima e change, incl ding: Absen  e ensi e mi iga ing fac ors or 
events, we see few plausible future scenarios where significant possibly catastrophic harm does not 
arise from he compo nded effec s of clima e change ); Rod Schoono er, The White House Blocked 
My Report on Climate Change and National Security, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/opinion/trump-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/5G5Q-
7N5H] (Explaining his decision to quit, he said: Science has long in ersec ed i h in elligence 
analysis. . . . [T]he [adminis ra ion s] decision o block he ri en es imon  is ano her example of a 
well-established pattern in the Trump administration of undercutting evidence that contradicts its 
policy positions. Beyond obstructing science, this action also undermined the analytic independence 
of a major element of the intelligence community. When a White House can shape or suppress 
intelligence analysis that it deems out of line with its political messaging, then the intelligence 
community has no true analytic independence. I believe such acts weaken our nation. ). 
270. See, e.g., STATE ENERGY & ENV T IMPACT CTR., N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., CLIMATE & HEALTH 
 
Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:53 PM 
2020] SEEKING CLIMATE JUSTICE IN STATE TORT LAW 1437 
 
and construction of pipelines271 and increasing drilling on federal lands 
and offshore.272 As this Article goes to press, the administration has 
accelerated its destruction of vital environmental and public health 
protections, by exploiting the coronavirus pandemic to abdicate its 
responsibility to enforce basic environmental and public health 
regulations governing the fossil fuel industry,273 to expedite oil and gas 
lease sales and permitting of pipelines and on federal lands,274 to provide 
the industry with relief from royalty payments that were already well 
                                                     
SHOWDOWN IN THE COURTS 3 4 (2019) (de ailing he Tr mp adminis ra ion s repeal or eakening 
of si  r les [ ha ] pro ide he larges  and bes  near-term opportunities to reduce climate pollution 
from the highest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions: the power sector (coal-fired electric 
generation); the transportation sector (cars and light trucks); the oil and gas sector; and the waste 
sector (landfills) . . . . these sources and sectors are core drivers of U.S. contributions to global climate 
change and, because of the legal obligation to reduce their emissions, they provide the most important 
near-term opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and fight against climate change. And yet 
the administration is doing the opposite, causing great harm to public health and the environment, as 
recently laid out in the Fourth National Climate Assessment and highlighted throughout this report. 
In shor , he Tr mp adminis ra ion is preparing o ake s o er he clima e cliff ). 
271. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Trump Aims to Speed Pipeline Projects by Limiting State 
Environmental  Reviews,  INSIDECLIMATE  NEWS  (Apr.  11,  2019),  https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/11042019/trump-pipeline-executive-order-environmental-review-keystone-xl-clean-water-act-
states-rightsbra [https://perma.cc/8EKP-5Z8W] (reporting on two executive orders limiting 
environmental reviews of pipelines). 
272. John Schwartz, Major Climate Change Rules the Trump Administration is Reversing, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/climate/climate-rule-trump-
reversing.html [https://perma.cc/UU3N-GD67]. 
273. See Oliver Milman & Emily Holden, Trump Administration Allows Companies to Break 
Pollution Laws During Coronavirus Pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/27/trump-pollution-laws-epa-allows-
companies-pollute-without-penalty-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/84AC-48TM] ( In an 
extraordinary move that has stunned former EPA officials, the Trump administration said it will not 
e pec  compliance i h he ro ine moni oring and repor ing of poll ion and on  p rs e penal ies 
for breaking these rules . . . There is no end da e se  for his dropping of enforcemen . ). I  bears 
mention that the Trump Administration announced that it was lifting compliance obligations a week 
after receiving a letter from the American Petroleum Institute, the industry trade association discussed 
supra section III.B, making that very request. See Letter from Michael J. Sommers, President & Chief 
Exec. Officer, API, to Donald J. Trump, President, U.S. (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/News/Letters-Comments/2020/3202020-API-Letter-to-President 
-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK4K-Z83Y] ( [T]he oil and natural gas industry needs to maintain safe 
and reliable operations [during the pandemic], taking into consideration that there may be limited 
personnel capacity to manage the full scope of the current regulatory requirements. As such, we will 
be requesting assistance in temporarily waiving non-essential compliance obligations from the 
rele an  agencies and depar men s i hin o r Adminis ra ion and/or heir s a e co n erpar s. ). 
274. See, e.g., Amy Westervelt & Emily Gertz, The Climate Rules Being Rolled Back During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, DRILLED NEWS (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.drillednews.com/post/the-
climate-covid-19-policy-tracker [https://perma.cc/WQJ8-TH6G] (documenting and mapping fossil 
fuel-friendly changes being made by the Trump Administration during the pandemic, including 
opening comment periods on pipeline projects and oil and gas leases). 
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below market value for extraction on federal lands,275 and to urge 
Congress to allocate billions in stimulus funding to bail out the industry 
by purchasing near worthless oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as 
other storage sites have been filled.276 
In such a situation, state tort law is one among many legal and policy 
tools urgently needed to address the myriad climate harms exacerbated by 
he federal go ernmen s ac ions and fail res o ac . This is he gap-filling 
role that state tort law has been serving for this co n r s residents for 
decades. In addition to redressing harms and deterring corporate 
misconduct,277 or  la  can ser e o prod  federal polic makers o ake 
much-needed actions to protect those that they serve.278 
The defendan s  second-wave strategy of federalizing state tort law 
threatens to cut off this vital avenue of redress and of corporate 
accountability in the U.S. system at the time that we are facing the most 
serious threats that we have ever faced. Now more than ever, state tort law 
must be allowed to serve its long-standing functions that provide the 
public with a safety net when federal protections are weak or non-existent. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the second-wave defense strategy of federalizing state tort law 
is wrong-headed as a legal matter, and disastrous as a policy matter. All 
law is going to have to deal with the climate crisis in order to be relevant, 
whether it be international, national, or local. Tort law is a small but 
important part of all state law in this country. The second-wave climate 
                                                     
275. See Heather Richards, BLM to Expedite Royalty Relief During Pandemic, E&E NEWS (Apr. 
27, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2020/04/27/stories/1062988129 (last visited Aug. 10, 
2020) (repor ing on g idance iss ed b  he B rea  of Land Managemen  enco rag[ing] prod cers 
to apply for either a suspension of federal leases or a reduced royalty rate from the existing 12.5% of 
fair marke  al e ).  
276. See Stephen Cunningham et al., Funding to Fill U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Cut from 
Stimulus Plan, WORLD OIL (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/3/25/funding-to-
refill-us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-cut-from-stimulus-plan [https://perma.cc/SZ39-E77G]; Sam 
Meredith, The Hunt for Oil Storage Space Is On He e  H  I  Works and Why It Matters, CNBC 
(Apr. 22, 2020, 3:07 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/22/oil-prices-heres-how-oil-storage-
works-and-why-capacity-matters.html [https://perma.cc/44DW-26ZM]. 
277. Cf. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 126 27 
(2005) ( Tor  liabili  ser es o impor an  and rela ed f nc ions nser ed b  reg la ion: or  liabili  
compensates those injured by products found to impose an unjustified risk, and, in so doing, it deters 
excessive risk-taking by forcing the risk-taker to absorb the costs that come with marketing a product 
ha  imposes an nj s ifiable risk of harm. ). 
278. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of 
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 423 (2011); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 
U.S. 410, 418 (2011) (noting the plaintiffs filed their claim in that case well before  the EPA had 
even recognized carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as pollutants  subject to regulation 
under the CAA). 
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tort suits are part of larger global movement of resorting to the courts to 
demand climate justice that the IPCC presciently predicted over a decade 
ago. The current era of climate disruption and its catastrophic threats 
demand not only new and improved legal and policy mechanisms, but also 
the use of current ones including state tort law to the fullest 
extent possible. 
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